Design hazard analysis, and system level testing of a university propulsion system for spacecraft application by Siebert, Joseph R.
Scholars' Mine 
Masters Theses Student Theses and Dissertations 
Spring 2009 
Design hazard analysis, and system level testing of a university 
propulsion system for spacecraft application 
Joseph R. Siebert 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/masters_theses 
 Part of the Aerospace Engineering Commons 
Department: 
Recommended Citation 
Siebert, Joseph R., "Design hazard analysis, and system level testing of a university propulsion system for 
spacecraft application" (2009). Masters Theses. 4656. 
https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/masters_theses/4656 
This thesis is brought to you by Scholars' Mine, a service of the Missouri S&T Library and Learning Resources. This 
work is protected by U. S. Copyright Law. Unauthorized use including reproduction for redistribution requires the 
permission of the copyright holder. For more information, please contact scholarsmine@mst.edu. 

DESIGN, HAZARD ANALYSIS, AND SYSTEM LEVEL TESTING 
 
OF A UNIVERSITY PROPULSION SYSTEM  
 












Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the  
 
MISSOURI UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree 
 
 









Dr. Henry J. Pernicka, Advisor 
Dr. David W. Riggins 




























The Missouri Science and Technology Satellite (M-SAT) design team on the 
campus of the Missouri University of Science and Technology has developed a pair of 
satellites to perform an autonomous formation flight mission.  To enable the mission, a 
unique cold gas propulsion system was developed which utilizes the refrigerant R-134a 
as propellant.  This thesis details the design process and considerations which led to the 
propulsion system as integrated into the satellite for the Flight Competition Review of the 
NS4 competition.  The design process described flowed from the mission requirements 
and program restrictions down through component-level requirements and resulted in a 
system capable of performing the assigned duties.  The hazard analysis conducted for this 
thesis also expanded on previous analyses to address key issues and AFRL concerns.  
The analysis showed the system to be safe for personnel and equipment as designed.  
Finally, a propulsion test platform was developed to address the few remaining physical 
and theoretical performance questions remaining.   
While future propulsion systems developed at Missouri S&T may face vastly 
different design and mission requirements, the example set forth by the NS4 system and 
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The role satellites play in society today cannot be exaggerated as they directly 
impact every aspect of life, from the morning commute to evening entertainment.  Such 
an all pervasive technology must continually adapt and improve to meet the ever 
expanding needs of the parent society while expending fewer resources.  To meet the 
changing demands of the space industry, a paradigm shift in satellite design and operation 
is necessary.  Under current design practices, satellites are large, complex systems which 
take a great deal of resources to launch and operate while lacking crucial flexibility in 
mission objectives.  Small satellites offer an alternative approach to satellite operations 
with increased mission flexibility and smaller resource expenditure being the main 
attraction.   
The vision that many people hold for the future sees constellations of small 
satellites, large and small, working together to accomplish the same goals of their much 
larger predecessors.  Within the constellation, common tasks would be distributed among 
the individual satellites thus allowing the platform to have redundancy and simplicity.  
Also, such a design allows the entire constellation to be retasked merely by exchanging a 
few of the satellites rather than having to develop and launch and entirely new satellite.  
However, to fully realize the advantages offered by small satellites, enabling technologies 
such as micro-propulsion systems considered in this study must first be developed.    
1.1.  CLASSIFICATION OF SATELLITES 
There are many objective standards by which to classify satellites: mission, cost, 




satellite system upon launch, is perhaps the most useful since it has a direct correlation to 
launch costs associated with the project.  In general, the moniker of “small satellite” is 
given to payloads having mass less than 500 kilograms.  The commonly adopted 




Table 1.1: Satellite Classification System [1] 
Category Mass range (kg) 
Large Satellite >1,000 
Medium-Sized Satellite 500-1,000 
Small Satellite <500 
Minisatellite 100-500 








Small satellite programs are also often characterized by smaller operational 
budgets and quicker development times.  This fact makes small satellite development 
feasible for university level programs as well as for technology demonstration platforms.   
1.2.  UNIVERSITY NANOSAT PROGRAM 
The University Nanosat Program (UNP) is a joint endeavor between the Air Force 
Research Laboratories Space Vehicle Directorate (AFRL/RV), the Air Force Office of 
Scientific Research (AFOSR), and the American Institute of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics (AIAA) with the stated purpose of encouraging and training the next 




proto-flight satellite with a mission that is of interest to the Department of Defense 
(DOD).  The program is set up in a competition format between participating universities 
vying for a free launch through the Space Experiment Review Board (SERB) process.   
The competition is a two year cycle consisting of multiple design reviews by 
AFRL and Industry professionals.  The course of the competition is as follows [2]: 
Proposal Phase – The cycle begins with the proposal phase, in which interested 
universities submit documents detailing the university’s objectives and capabilities.  
These documents are reviewed by AFRL personnel and a small number (~10) of 
universities are accepted into the program. 
System Concept Review (SCR) – SCR comes early within the two year program 
and is meant as a chance for each university to convey to UNP officials the mission 
objectives, design concepts, program feasibility, and expected schedule of their project. 
Preliminary Design Review (PDR) – PDR is a review of the university’s initial 
design with special attention paid to the implementation of all safety guidelines.  Also at 
this time, AFRL representatives ensure teams have implemented proper program 
management and system engineering practices. 
Critical Design Review (CDR) – CDR occurs at the end of the first year when 
university designs should be between 90% and 95% complete.  This review is the last 
chance for AFRL representatives to assess the design for maturity, inherent risk, and 
compliance with program requirements before universities move in earnest into the build 
phase of the competition. 
Proto-Qualification Review (PQR) – PQR occurs during the second year of the 




Flight Competition Review (FCR) – FCR is the final review during the 
competition process.  Universities must deliver a proto-flight satellite to the competition 
along with supporting documentation.   
In addition to these design reviews, the UNP also provides guidance and training 
through a series of documents and workshops.  Each team is given access to the UNP 
User’s Guide which gives a detailed overview of the program milestones and design 
requirements that must be implemented in each university’s spacecraft.  Following the 
guidelines within the user’s guide ensures each university spacecraft meets strict range 
safety criteria and will be able to survive launch.  Three workshops are held during the 
competition; SHOT I, SHOT II, and a Satellite Fabrication Course.  During both Shot I 
and Shot II, students from each university build a small device which is flown onboard a 
high-altitude weather balloon.  The satellite fabrication class offered students an 
opportunity to observe AFRL satellite fabrication techniques as well as receive valuable 
information on proper procedure implementation.   
1.3.  M SAT OVERVIEW AND TEAM HISTORY 
The M SAT program is a student design organization on the Missouri University 
of Science and Technology (S&T) campus.  It began in 2004 with stated purpose of 
designing and building a satellite capable of performing technology demonstrations and 
furthering space systems knowledge within the community of S&T students.  The 
conceptual satellite was to test and compare methods for maintaining Distributed Space 




In January of 2005, the M SAT program (then MR SAT) was accepted into the 
UNP Nanosat 4 competition (NS4).  Though the course of the NS4 competition, the focus 
changed from comparing two methods of maintaining formation flight to a technology 
demonstration of autonomous formation flight.  The M SAT team placed third out of 
eleven entries in the NS4 competition, a notable achievement for a team new to the 
program.  The team was also named the Most Improved School. 
1.3.1.  Mission Overview.  The main objective of the M-SAT program is the 
technological demonstration of close range autonomous formation flight utilizing two 
microsatellites; MR SAT (Missouri-Rolla Satellite) and MRS SAT (Missouri-Rolla 
Second Satellite).  The formation is to be a follower/leader configuration with MR SAT 
maintaining a distance of 50 meters ± 5 meters behind MRS SAT.   
Achieving this objective requires the implementation of unique solutions to 
common satellite challenges.  Inter-satellite communication, Attitude and Orbit 
Determination and Control, and indeed Satellite Propulsion all required new approaches 
if mission objectives were to be met.  Technology demonstrations in these areas will 
provide future small satellite projects with more options to meet difficult mission objects 
through low-cost solutions.   
The mission is organized into different mission modes based on the task required 
during that particular phase of the mission.  The main divisions within the modes of 
operation are Launch, Initialization, Power-Up, Detumble, Pre-Deploy, Separation, 
Formation Flight, Range Test, and Extended Mission [3].  Each main mode is further 
divided into specific tasks that must be accomplished by the subsystems for the 




while the satellites are in a docked configuration, as shown in Figure 1.1, while all other 

















1.3.2.  Current Status.  After the conclusion of the NS4 competition, the team 
decided to continue with the construction and testing of the NS4 satellite design.  The 
project is now entering the “Flat Sat” phase of development in which systems are to be 
integrated electronically to determine functionality and compatibility.  The primary focus 
of this phase involves the C&DH and Power subsystems.  As various electronic interfaces 
are developed, more of the satellite can be integrated into the Flat Sat until such a time as 




Independent of the Flat Sat, subsystems continue testing their components for 
functionality and performance.  The structural strength of the satellite is currently being 
modeled using Finite Element Analysis. 
1.4.  PROPULSION REQUIREMENTS 
Two sources of requirements are placed on the propulsion subsystem: NS4 design 
requirements and safety guidelines and M SAT mission requirements.  Obviously both 
sets of requirements are imperative to the successful implementation of the satellite 
project; however, satisfying both sets of requirements is a difficult undertaking for a 
single propulsion system. 
1.4.1.  M SAT Mission Requirements.  As stated previously, the main objective 
of the M SAT project is the demonstration of close proximity autonomous free formation 
flight.  Any formation keeping mission requires a means to overcome the orbit 
perturbations inherent in space flight, hence some sort of propulsion system is necessary.  
Stemming from this main mission objective produces three system-level requirements: 
• Provide all torques and forces required to maintain attitude and orbit 
control. 
• Provide all torques and forces to maintain 50 meter formation flight with 
MRS SAT. 
• Provide sufficient performance specifications and propellant mass to 
perform one orbit of formation flight. 
Implicit within the mission requirements attached to the propulsion subsystem are 




Obviously a system which does not fit within the design envelope of the satellite or is 
excessively massive as to render the satellite unresponsive would fail to successfully 
accomplish the mission.  Indeed, much of the system design, from the number and 
placement of thrusters to the necessary tank pressure, stems directly from these three 
simple statements.  However, while adhering to these requirements ensures mission 
success, it by no means ensures the design of a safe, launchable system. For that, other 
requirements and regulations are placed upon the system. 
1.4.2.  NS4 Propulsion Safety Requirements.  Given that the overall objective 
of the UNP is to develop flight-worthy spacecraft and guide such spacecraft though the 
launch process, safety is a foremost concern.  Strict design criteria, while possibly 
inhibiting creative design approaches, ensure that any delivered spacecraft will be able to 
successfully navigate the flight approval process with a minimum of design changes.  
Different launch ranges and vehicles have unique regulations which must be met before 
launch clearance will be granted.  In light of this, the only prudent course of action is to 
adhere to the most stringent of these standards: i.e. Space Shuttle Secondary Payload 
requirements.   
For convenience and ease of use, the UNP has summarized the various 
requirements into a single limited release document: the NS4 User’s Guide.  As part of 
the NS4 competition, each team was expected to comply with guidelines and design 
requirements set forth in the User’s Guide to ensure the safety and utility of the final 
satellite.  In regard to a traditional propulsion system, the major requirement concerns the 
operation and implantation of a pressurized system.  Any pressurized system must meet 




Control Requirements for Payloads Using the Space Shuttle.  To meet the standard, the 




Table 1.2 Sealed Container Classification Limits [2] 
Propellant Property Limit 
P – Pressure (Absolute) < 689.48 kPa (100 psi) 





On top of the sealed container requirement, the UNP provides a list of practices 
and design choices deemed either “discouraged” or “prohibited.”  Such practices that 
affect a propulsion system are listed below: 
• The use of pyrotechnic devices and/or mechanisms is prohibited 
• The use of toxic and/or volatile fluids or gases is prohibited 
• The use of any material likely to undergo a phase change during launch or 
on orbit is discouraged 
• Cast metallic or welded joints are prohibited 
• It is prohibited for universities to manufacture assemblies for which safety 
is highly dependent upon the build or assembly process. (Composite 
Materials and certain deployment devices for example)  If such assemblies 





While following such guidelines will ensure the safety of the final design, it does 
not guarantee that the final design will be capable of meeting mission parameters.  
Universities are encouraged to follow User’s Guide requirements wherever possible, and 
certain guidelines are non-negotiable; however, if need can be demonstrated a waiver 
process can be initiated.   
1.5.  PURPOSE 
This thesis expands upon the knowledge previously acquired by the M SAT 
design team in the area of small satellite propulsion.  Prior works have focused on the 
design and theoretical performance of the system and have laid the foundation for further 
development.  With this work, the author attempts to discuss the design process and how 
the mission requirements and restrictions determine system-level requirements which in 
turn directly affect component-level requirements.  By highlighting the process which led 
to the NS4 propulsion system design, in essence documenting the thoughts and motives 
of the design team, this thesis can serve as a guide for future system developments.  The 
work is further expanded to include a hazard analysis and a system level testing plan to 
advance the analysis of the current system and again serve as a guide for future systems. 
1.6.  THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This work is organized into six major sections to facilitate the understanding of 
the reader.  A brief description of the content within each section is given below: 
Literature Review – Following the introductory section, a short literature review 
is provided to present the proper context for this work.  Within this section, an overview 




various propulsion methods to follow.  Finally, the expected future development of small 
satellites and the necessary technological advances are explored in detail. 
System Overview – The propulsion system designed for integration into MR 
SAT is described in detail with an emphasis on component functionality.  The integrated 
system and necessary design compromised and choices are explained.  
Hazard Analysis – This section describes the possible hazards inherent within 
the system and the methods of mitigation implemented in the design of the propulsion 
system.  It attempts to prove that the system is reasonably safe. 
Testing – The testing methods and current results for the system are detailed 
within this section.  The design and purpose of each system level test is discussed, and 
results are presented where applicable. 
Conclusions – The final section summarizes the details previously described and 




2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1.  HISTORY OF SMALL SATELLITES 
Over the centuries, space has captured the imagination of layman and expert 
alike: its vast expanse a promise of knowledge waiting to be discovered.  As 
understanding of the physical realm advanced, so too did the methods and technologies 
utilized in scientific exploration.  With the launch of Sputnik in October 1957, mankind’s 
reach was finally extended beyond the atmosphere into the realm of space.  While a 
significant achievement, Sputnik did little to further mankind’s understanding of space 
containing only radio transmitters and no scientific payload. [4]  Explorer I, launched 
only four months later by the United States, was a slightly more technically advanced 
platform incorporating basic scientific instruments to study the background radiation 
environment. [5]  This first generation of artificial satellites were all small satellites out 
of necessity; however, as rocket performance increased small satellites began to give way 
to large, multifunctional platforms. 
Throughout the next couple decades, while not entirely disbanded, small satellites 
were deemphasized within the space industry.  Instead, satellites took advantage of the 
greater lifting capacity of modern rockets and ballooned in both size and mass.  The 
mission tasks assigned to these satellites were thought too complex for their smaller 
counterparts and industry officials and scientists did not want to waste precious launches 
on inferior payloads.  Satellite programs became massive undertakings with long 




devastating to development programs and as a consequence conservative design practices 
were implemented.   
During this time, small satellites programs were still active both building and 
launching spacecraft without much acknowledgement from the wider community.  [6]  
Several amateur radio satellites were launched including OSCAR (Orbiting Satellite 
Carrying Amateur Radio) type satellites which were extremely successful.  The first of 
these, OSCAR 1, was launched in 1961 and had a mass of a mere five kilograms.  [6]  By 
1983, OSCAR 10 was launched with a wet mass of 90 kilograms. OSCAR 10 employed 
the first amateur built satellite propulsion system and many advanced systems including 
digital “store and forward” communication. [7]  Using this technology, a single, small 
satellite in LEO could provide global communication coverage which is beyond the 
capabilities of the far larger commercial communication satellites in Geosynchronous 
orbit. [6]   
With the development of smaller electronics the trend began to reverse and once 
again small satellites began to be commonplace.  With the advent of the Distributed 
Space Systems (DSS) concept, small satellites are now performing missions previously 
the domain of large, complex satellites. 
2.2.  FUTURE OF SMALL SATELLITES 
Small satellites hold the promise of a new space concept; however, the 
implementation and full advantage of such new methods have not yet been realized.  
Currently the moniker small satellite project implies not merely a satellite of significantly 




satellite projects will strive to keep the associated cost benefits while increasing the 
complexity of mission options. 
The applications for small satellites appear boundless.  As individual satellites the 
missions will remain relatively simple yet allow for important scientific knowledge to be 
collected.  Such was the case with the Chemical Release Observation (CRO) Canister 
mission where simple small satellites were used to observe thrusters firings.  Each of the 
CRO canisters was aerodynamically stabilized along its velocity vector and contained 25 
kilograms of hydrazinic chemicals designed to be released under observation from both 
the ground and the space shuttle. [6]     
The advantages of small satellites become apparent when the distributed space 
system concept is employed. One proposed mission calls for a cluster of a 400 identical 
small satellites for global communication.  All the satellites within the cluster could 
remain unguided after insertion into low Earth orbit (LEO) and still maintain 95% global 
coverage.  Without the need for attitude or orbit control, the base design of the satellite 
remains straightforward; thus reducing cost and allowing for mass production.  In 
addition to the manufacturing savings, such a cluster has the advantage of redundancy in 
that the loss of one or several of the satellites would not significantly reduce the 
capabilities of the system [6]. 
Adding guidance and control to the satellites takes the distributed space system 
concept one step farther and allows for even more complex missions to be accomplished.  
For instance a constellation of satellites flying in formation could be used to create a 
virtual aperture, in effect a very large lens, to use in imagining missions.  This virtual 




optics of much greater size than could ever be employed.  However, for such a system to 
work each satellite within the formation must maintain strict relative position tolerances.   
2.3.  PROPULSION CONSIDERATIONS 
Propulsion systems for satellites are chosen by a multitude of factors.  The 
primary purpose of the system, be it attitude control or orbit adjustment, must first be 
considered as each mission goal places different requirements upon the system.  Ideally, 
multiple propulsion tasks would be performed using a single propulsion system so as to 
reduce satellite complexity, system dry mass, and mission cost. [8]  Additional factors 
must also be considered such as the necessary response time for maneuvers, the necessary 
precision of the system, and the expected mission lifetime.   
Maneuver response time is an important consideration.  Often times during a 
mission slew maneuvers, where the orientation of the satellite is drastically changed, 
must be performed within a narrow time window. [8]   A propulsion system designed 
merely for attitude control may not possess the brute force capability required to enact 
such rapid changes.  However, a system capable of rapid maneuvers often times lacks the 
small impulse-bit necessary for precise attitude control.  In missions that require both, 
either a compromise must be made to arrive at the optimal solution or separate systems 
must be employed. 
Finally, mission time line and life expectancy of the spacecraft must be 
considered before any propulsion system is implemented.  Missions requiring vast 
amounts of propulsion or long mission life times will require equivalently more 




tank volume and adds mass to the satellite it is important to match system performance 
requirements with system efficiency.  The specific impulse, ISP, is often used as a means 
to objectively gauge the propulsion efficiency of various systems.   Below; Table 2.1 




Table 2.1: Expected Isp Ranges for Propulsion Systems [6] 
Propulsion System Expected Isp (s) 
Cold Gas 30 – 70 
Liquid (bipropellant) 305 – 460 
Liquid (monopropellant) 140 – 240 
Solid 260 – 300 
Hybrid 250 – 350 
Electric 300 – 10,000 




2.4.  PROPULSION OPTIONS 
Overall, there are three major subsets of propulsion systems: cold gas, electrical, 
and chemical; although other types and hybrid systems do exist.   
2.4.1.  Cold Gas Systems.  Cold gas systems are the simplest of the propulsion 
options available to satellite designers.  Conceptually such a system is little more than a 
pressurized tank, a control valve, and a nozzle.  Cold gas thrusters work by accelerating 
an inert, high-pressure gas, typically Nitrogen or Xenon, through a nozzle to produce 
thrust.   
While the systems are valued for their relative simplicity and are often employed 
for attitude control, cold gas systems do have limitations.  The high-pressure propellant 




lost. [8]  In addition to propellant loss, the systems are not nearly as efficient as other 
propulsion options and cannot generate the high forces necessary for certain orbital 
maneuvers. 
2.4.2. Chemical Systems.  Chemical systems have a long history of providing 
both access to space and propulsion for satellites.  Their greatest advantage over other 
propulsion systems is the high thrust they are capable of producing.  Working in similar 
fashion to Cold Gas Thrusters, Chemical systems rely on a combustion process to impart 
energy into the flow before it is accelerated out the nozzle.   
Many differing configurations of chemical propulsion systems are available to 
satellite designers including liquid propellant, solid propellant, and hybrid systems.  Each 
configuration has both advantages and disadvantages depending on the intended use of 
the system.  For satellite propulsion, liquid propellant systems—both monopropellant and 
bipropellant—are used due to their ability to be throttled.   
2.4.3. Electrical Systems.  Over the years electrical propulsion systems have 
become much more prevalent in spacecraft design.  Such systems utilize electromagnetic 
(EM) forces to impart energy into a flow and accelerate propellant; thus generating thrust.  
EM systems are highly valued for their Isp and the efficiency it implies.  Electric systems 
come in many configurations from electro-thermal resistojets to plasma expelling HALL 
thrusters.  Each thruster type has different power requirements and performance 
characteristics; thus, the type of thruster employed for a particular satellite mission is 




2.5. SURVEY OF SMALL SATELLITE PROPULSION  
Many of the first small satellites did not utilize any propulsive methods; instead 
relying on proper orbit insertion and spin stabilization to complete their missions.  As 
small satellites began to require the ability to alter their orbit during the mission, 
propulsion systems became incorporated into the design.   
For example, the 90 kg amateur radio satellite, OSCAR 10, was launched on June 
16, 1983 as the first amateur built satellite to incorporate a propulsive system. [7]  The 
propulsion system was a liquid bipropellant chemical system featuring an S400 engine 
designed to insert the satellite into the desired orbit and maintain the orbit once reached. 
[9]  However, a collision with the launch vehicle coupled with a longer than expected 
firing time of the thruster saw the satellite fail to achieve the desired orbit.  A second 
attempt to fire the thruster failed due to a loss of pressurization within the helium 
blowdown system and the subsequent loss of propellant and oxidizer pressure.  [10] 
Traditional cold gas thruster systems also came to be incorporated into small 
satellites.  For instance, in 1991 the DARPA Microsat mission consisted of a 
constellation of small satellites each fitted with a cold gas propulsion system utilizing 
nitrogen as propellant.  While each 22.7 kg satellite was designed with four years worth 
of propellant initially stored at 6000 psi, a lower than intended orbit caused the formation 
to deorbit after only a year of operation.  [11] The European Space Agency (ESA) also 
employed a traditional cold gas thruster system for its original Cryosat mission launched 
in 2005.  The propulsion system designed for both attitude and orbit control stored 36.2 




three years; however, the launch vehicle failed during liftoff and the satellite was lost.  
[13] 
Electric thrusters have also been implemented into small satellites.  The 300 kg 
Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd. (SSTL) UoSAT-12 launched in 1999 and employed 
both a cold gas thruster system and an electro-thermal propulsion system.  The 0.125 N 
resistojet utilized nitrous-oxide propellant heated by a 100 W resistive heating element.  
The thruster was designed for orbit maintenance and could raise the 650 km orbit a full 3 
km in one hour’s time.  The 2.5 kg of propellant allowed for 14 hours of thruster 
operation.  [14] [15] 
Finally, non-traditional cold gas thruster systems utilizing liquefied gas as 
propellant have been successfully flown.  The University of Toronto Institute for 
Aerospace Studies’ (UTIAS) CanX-2 nanosatellite was launched in April 2008. [16]  The 
mission was a technology demonstration of among other systems a micropropulsion 
system utilizing sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) as a propellant.  As designed, the 10 mL 
propellant tank stored sufficient SF6 at a MEOP of 500 psi to provide 2 m/s of ΔV.  The 
system will also provide 50 mN of thrust and have an Isp of approximately 45 s.  [17]  
The SSTL SNAP-1 satellite launched in June 2000 also employed a cold gas propulsion 
system utilizing liquefied gas as propellant.   The uniquely designed system used butane 
as propellant in a rendezvous mission between small satellites.  A total of 32.6 grams of 
butane was stored as a liquid within a 1.1 m coiled tube with an internal volume of 65 
cm3.  The propellant was vaporized by a 15 ohm (4.3 W at 8 Vdc) resistive heater prior to 
expulsion to provide a theoretical ΔV of 3.47 m/s.  Orbital data showed the initial 




predicted and erratic in thrust produced.  This suggests that liquid propellant droplets 
were expelled along with the gas; thus creating higher thrust at reduced propulsive 
efficiency.  [18] 
2.6.  ROLE OF UNIVERSITY PROJECTS 
Universities hold a special place within the space industry.  While university 
projects traditionally lack the resources, in terms of both experience and money, of 
industry projects, they more than make up for this in terms of design freedom.  Whereas 
industry must adhere to conservative principles and above all the bottom line, university 
projects have the freedom to explore new methods and technologies.   
Given this freedom offered by university projects, it seems only prudent for 
companies to form a partnership with universities to develop programs focus on areas of 
interest to the space community.  In this way, university projects can directly benefit 
industry interests while at the same time developing and training a new generation for the 




3. SYSTEM DESIGN OVERVIEW 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The propulsion system for the MR SAT formation flight mission was designed to 
meet the needs of the satellite while fitting within the guidelines and time constraints of 
the NS4 program.  As such, certain design aspects of the system are products of necessity 
and not necessarily directly related to the mission requirements.  This section describes 
the system as designed and details the choices, compromises, and iterations of the design 
process. 
3.2. INITIAL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
The beginning of any design process is an important period with far reaching 
repercussions on the final design, particularly for projects with short durations and time 
tables.  The MR SAT project, as part of the University Nanosat Program, had a two year 
concept-to-product time table with much of that time allocated to building the system.  
As a consequence, the initial design choices for the MR SAT propulsion system were 
made in the context of information available to the designers early on in the project with 
such choices being re-examined as new information became available. 
3.2.1. Pertinent Mission Requirements.  As discussed in Section 1, the 
propulsion system for MR SAT has three mission requirements.  Stated briefly, the 
Propulsion subsystem is charged with providing the means for both responsive attitude 
control and orbital control for formation flight.  Each mission statement is examined 




3.2.1.1 Provide means to maintain attitude and orbit control.  Attitude and 
orbit control are vitally important to the successful completion of the M SAT mission.  
Attitude control is particularly essential in that without tight bounds on the orientation of 
the satellite while in orbit, communication with the ground would be impossible.  Also, 
proper orientation is important for the solar panels to maintain the appropriate level of 
solar exposure and sustain the power levels for the satellite.  The goal of the Attitude 
subsystem is to maintain attitude control within ±7 degrees of nominal satellite 
orientation. [19]  While means other than propulsion do exist for attitude control, these 
devices are not as responsive and require significantly more time to slowly change the 
attitude of the satellite.  During the formation flight mode of the mission, and particularly 
immediately after the deployment of MRS SAT, quick response to changing rotation 
rates is necessary.   
To satisfy the attitude control requirements for the mission, the MR SAT 
propulsion system must be capable of providing full three-axis rotational control.  This in 
turn means that a system with multiple thrusters is required.  Also, as discussed in 
Section 2, a balance must be struck between the response time of the system and the 
precision of the attitude maneuvers to avoid overcompensating and propellant waste.   
3.2.1.2 Provide means to maintain 50 meter formation with MRS SAT.  The 
mission for the MR SAT project involves two satellites autonomously maintaining a 
follow/lead formation.  Upon launch, the two satellites are coupled in a stack 
arrangement connected by a separation device.  After separation, the formation must 




that the two satellites will reach the desired 50 meter separation distance in two minutes.  
Therefore, any propulsion system designed to implement formation flight for this mission 
must have the capacity, i.e. available thrust, to quickly mitigate relative velocities and 
establish the proper formation.  Once the formation is formed, it must be maintained 
within the specified bounds by the use of the propulsion system.  To achieve this as 
efficiently as possible, it is necessary to be able to thrust in as many translational axes as 
possible, thus eliminating unnecessary rotational maneuvers. 
3.2.1.3 Provide sufficient performance for one orbit of formation flight.  The 
lifetime of the mission is a major consideration and is, at least for the purposes of 
formation flight, defined by available propellant mass.  To demonstrate that the methods 
utilized by the MR SAT program to conduct autonomous formation flight are valid and 
effective, a minimum mission duration is required to insure that adequate data are 
collected.  Obviously longer time spans are desirable and would provide more data; 
however, one orbit of formation flight was chosen as the minimum mission lifetime since 
it was deemed effective for demonstration purposes and feasible given program 
requirements. 
Ensuring adequate performance to achieve one orbit of formation flight is made 
far more difficult by the volumetric and mass constraints placed upon the system.  
Storage of large masses of propellant at safe pressures, as defined by the NS4 User’s 
Guide, necessitates the use of large volume storage vessels.  However, since the exact 
amount of propellant necessary for the mission was unknown and unknowable early in 




3.2.2. MR SAT Propulsion Options.  Defining the mission objectives and 
understanding the program guidelines and requirement allowed the initial design of the 
MR SAT propulsion system to be determined.  Due to volumetric, mass, and time 
considerations, the Propulsion subsystem endeavored to design a single propulsion 
system to encompass both attitude and orbital control during formation flight as opposed 
to a separate system for each need.  In the sections below, the pros and cons of the three 
main system options are discussed. 
3.2.2.1 Chemical systems for MR SAT propulsion.  Chemical systems were not 
considered a viable option for the MR SAT mission despite performance characteristics 
within the bands necessary for successful completion of the mission.  The issue with such 
systems was not complexity; indeed systems are available commercially specifically 
designed for small satellites, but rather the chemical reaction process inherent to their 
use.  NS4 guidelines on propulsion systems prohibit chemical reactions and combustion 
as unsafe practices; however, should a satellite be constructed outside the UNP, chemical 
systems could be explored as a possible propulsion option.  This is especially true 
considering that at minimum chemical systems have nearly double the ISP of cold gas 
systems. 
3.2.2.2 Electrical systems for MR SAT propulsion.  Electrical systems merited 
some consideration.  With the total required ΔV of the mission as yet undefined the 
relatively high ISP values of electric propulsion made such systems attractive.  Relatively 
simple electrical systems such as resistojets, arcjets, and micro pulsed plasma thrusters 




Resistojets are one step more advanced than cold gas thrusters in that they utilize 
small resistive heaters just prior to the nozzle to add energy to the flow.  The added 
energy increases the efficiency of the thrust generation and thus preserves propellant 
mass.  Arcjets work in much the same manner only utilizing an electric arc instead of 
resistive heaters to accomplish the heat addition.  While both these devices would help 
extend formation flight time by increasing system efficiency; it comes at the cost of extra 
system mass for power conditioning units and added power draw on the satellite.  The 
need for multiple thrusters, lack of experience with electrical propulsion, and the limited 
power available on the satellite made both resistojets and arcjets infeasible for 
implementation in MR SAT. 
As an alternative, µPPTs are traditionally used for attitude control work since they 
are capable of very small impulse maneuvers and work in a pulsed fashion instead of the 
continuous flow achieved by other systems.  As such they do not truly meet the needs of 
the M SAT mission; however, should two systems be employed to perform attitude and 
orbit control separately, µPPTs would be a possibility for the attitude control 
requirement.  For this reason, a prototype µPPT was to be included on MR SAT, 
assuming space, mass, and power for the device were available, as a technology 
demonstration for future missions.  
3.2.2.3 Cold gas thrusters for MR SAT propulsion.   Cold gas thrusters were 
perhaps the best option for MR SAT propulsion given their simple design and 




familiar to the Propulsion subsystem and thus could be implemented by the student 
designers quickly.   
The limiting factor with cold gas thrusters is the third mission requirement of 
producing a system capable of providing a full orbit of formation flight.  While the 
required total ΔV for the mission was not yet known, the theoretical performance of the 
system using traditional propellants and tanks of reasonable volumes was not 
encouraging.  For example, a 2.5 liter tank of nitrogen when stored under the safe 
conditions set by the UNP and ignoring the likely loss of 10% of the propellant mass is 
only capable of producing 0.47 m/s of ΔV. [20]   
While cold gas thrusters offered the greatest chance of success for the Propulsion 
subsystem in terms of completing the system, clearly the issue of propellant choice and 
storage had to be carefully considered and became an integral design aspect.   
3.2.2.4 Chosen system for MR SAT propulsion.  To achieve the mission 
objectives utilizing the cold gas thruster concept, a method of low-pressure, high-density 
propellant storage was imperative.  This is not possible with traditional gaseous 
propellants as density and pressure are directly related for a container at a given 
temperature.  Employing a liquid propellant realizes the necessary storage conditions; 
however, the expulsion of liquid propellant greatly reduces the efficiency of the 
propulsive device.  Therefore, a compromise system, where propellant is stored as a 





A saturated-liquid propellant is a good choice to attain just such a compromise.  
Saturated-liquids are substances that over a given temperature range can exist in both the 
liquid and gaseous states.   Using such propellants, extra propellant mass can be stored in 
the tank as a higher density a liquid while the vapors are extracted and expelled to 
produce thrust.  Identifying the specific saturated-liquid that met all the safety and 
performance guidelines was challenging and necessitated consultation with the Missouri 
S&T Chemistry Department.   
In the end the selected propellant was the refrigerant R-134a due to its non-
reactive, non-toxic, and performance properties.  The refrigerant was to be used with the 
cold gas concept as the basis for MR SAT propulsion. 
3.2.3. Configuration Possibilities.  The placement and orientation of the 
thrusters within the confines of the satellite is critical to the final performance of the 
propulsion system; affecting both the rotation rates produced by the system and overall 
efficiency of maneuvers.  Thruster placement also is important with regard to integrating 
the propulsion system into the satellite in a manner that avoids conflict with other satellite 
systems.  
The main objective when configuring the thruster locations was to ensure the 
system could perform the attitude and orbit maneuvers required by the mission 
statements; i.e. the system had full three-axis rotational control and multiple axis 
translational control.  However, additional considerations required placing further 
restrictions on thruster placement to ease system integration. The first of these 
requirements entailed avoiding the top and bottom panels of MR SAT since these panels 




placement of thrusters in the middle of panels was discouraged due to possible 
interference with other satellite systems.  Finally, system complexity and overall cost was 
to be reduced by minimizing the number of thrusters needed to accomplish the mission 
goals. 
The configuration of thrusters for MR SAT was the product of the aforementioned 
reasons and time constraints; however, to exemplify the thought process necessary for 
designing a functional thruster pattern, the configuration used for MR SAT plus two other 
possible designs are analyzed below. 
3.2.3.1 Twelve thruster configuration.  The twelve thruster configuration is the 
most straightforward of the possible thruster arrangements for MR SAT.  Four thrusters 
are placed in each translational plane of motion and arranged in such a way so the thrust 
vector from half the thruster group directly opposes that of the other half.  To perform 
both translational and rotational maneuvers pairs of thrusters would fire in tandem; the 
specific pair of thrusters selected determining the maneuver performed.  Figure 3.1 shows 
what this thruster configuration would look like when implemented into MR SAT as well 
as which thruster pairs perform which maneuvers. 
This design has the benefit of providing direct maneuvering capability in all three 
translational and rotational axes; however, this comes at the cost of increased system 
complexity and cost due to the number of thrusters required.  Additionally, the design 





Figure 3.1: Maneuver Pairings - Twelve Thruster Configuration 
 
 
interference with satellite connection points or be placed along solar panels and risk 
possible solar cell contamination.   
3.2.3.2 Eight thruster angled configuration.  The angled nature of this 
configuration allows fewer thrusters to perform the same set of maneuvers as the twelve 




opposing panels.  The thrusters are arranged in a square pattern with each thruster placed 
at a corner and angled 45° as seen in Figure 3.2.  Four thrusters are fired simultaneously 
to achieve the desired thrust vector(s) for both rotational and translation maneuvers (see 










While such an arrangement does indeed provide a system capable of three axis 
rotational and translational maneuvers, it does so at the cost of overall system efficiency.  
The angled nature of the thrusters means that a portion of the force produced by each 
thruster is canceled out by the actions of the other active thrusters.  In fact, only a little 
over half (0.577) of the available thrust is converted into the resultant force vector.  
Additionally, achieving the precision in thruster placement and alignment necessary in 
order to ensure proper thrust vectors for such a design would drastically complicate the 
integration process.  In the end, the inefficiency of this design and the difficulties with 
integration were not compatible with the needs and requirements of MR SAT.    
3.2.3.3 Eight thruster straight configuration.  The thruster configuration chosen 
for MR SAT employs eight thrusters but does away with the angle of the previous 
configuration.  Instead of an equal number of thrusters in opposition, this method uses a 
single thruster directed through the CG of the satellite to offset the translational force of a 
thruster on the opposing panel in order to produce torque.  Figure 3.3 shows the thruster 
configuration and the thruster pairs utilized for various maneuvers.   
The design does an adequate job in meeting the requirements of MR SAT in that 
all rotational axes are controlled and the number of valves within the system is reduced; 
however, the translational axis through the top and bottom of MR SAT is left 











3.3. SYSTEM DESIGN 
With the preliminary design decisions for the MR SAT propulsion system 
complete, the next phase of design began.  Within this phase, specific component 
requirements were developed to ensure successful integration into a unified propulsion 
system.  Components were then sourced to meet the necessary criteria; moving the design 
from a general concept to a physical model utilizing real world components integrated 





3.3.1. System Components.  The components that make up a system determine 
the function and efficiency of that system; each component performing a particular task 
and adhering to specific requirements.  While a cold gas propulsion system is 
conceptually simple, incorporating physical components in the design presented 
challenges and required strict selection criteria.   
3.3.1.1 Propellant tank.  The propellant tank was a key component for the MR 
SAT propulsion system given the type of propellant selected.  During the development of 
tank requirements it was necessary to consider the unique challenges presented by 
propellants stored in a saturated liquid state.  Specifically, the tank must be equipped with 
a passive means to combat and prevent propellant slosh within the tank while on orbit.   
Propellant slosh occurs when the liquid propellant within the tank moves 
separately from the satellite structure; potentially disrupting the prescribed motion of the 
satellite.  The problem arises due to the way liquids behave in a zero g environment.  
Under the influence of gravity, liquids conform to the bottom of the containment vessel; 
however, without gravity liquids tend to form large globules moving freely within the 
tank.  Propellant Management Devices (PMDs) are established inside storage tanks to 
control slosh effects by breaking up large globules and restricting the free motion of 
liquids.  Another function often assigned to PMDs is ensuring that the propellant 
extracted from the tank is in the correct state, either liquid or gas.   
Therefore, the use of R-134a as a propellant set the major requirement for the 




capable of working with R-134a and designed to extract the gaseous state from the tank.  
This and additional requirements are listed in Table 3.1 below. 
 
 
Table 3.1: Propellant Tank Requirements [21] 
Requirement Reason 
Integrated PMD Necessary to control propellant slosh and ensure that the proper phase is extracted from the tank. 
All Metal Construction 
Safety requirement imposed by UNP officials.  Composite 
materials are deemed too great a risk without additional 
metal wrapping. 
Fit Within the 
Available Volume of 
MR SAT 
Exceeding the bounds of the satellite would violate UNP 
regulations.  In addition, available volume is limited by not 
only overall satellite dimensions, but also the volume 
necessary for other satellite components. 
Possess a Minimum 
Internal Volume of 2 L 
This volume was deemed necessary to provide sufficient 
propellant mass for satellite operations.  
Theoretical Burst 
Pressure 5X Greater 
than MEOP 
Factor of Safety required by UNP.  Ensures that pressure 
fluctuations will not cause a catastrophic breach of the 
tank. 
Reasonably Priced The M-SAT team was working with a limited budget. 
 
 
Two of the restrictions limited the options for commercially available tanks more 
than any other.  With a small satellite, the tank must be correspondingly small in 
dimension.  Many of the tanks sourced by the Propulsion Subsystem were simply too 
large to fit within the available volume of MR SAT.  Also, most commercially available 
tanks were designed either without integrated PMDs or with PMDs manufactured for 
liquid phase extraction.   
While many tanks were considered, only the Marotta BS25-001 tank fit all the 




PMD originally designed to prevent liquid butane from being injected into propellant 
lines; however, it would work equally well for R-134a.  An additional benefit of Marotta 
tank was its proven flight history and hence its space qualified nature.    Further 




Table 3.2: Flight Tank Specifications [21] 
Operational Temperature -40 °C to 65 °C -40 °F to 150 °F 
Maximum Expected Operating Pressure 
(MEOP) 1.600 MPa 232 psi 
Minimum Burst Pressure (MBP) 9.7975 MPa 1421 psi 
Volume Capacity 2500 cm3 153 in3 
Mass 1.476 kg 3.25 lb 
Maximum Body Length 32.6 cm 12.83 in 
Outside Diameter 110.314 mm 4.24 in 
Factor of Safety (MEOP : MBP) 6 : 1 
 
 
3.3.1.2 Isolation valves.  Safety is the foremost concern of UNP officials.  
Pressurized systems are inherently more prone to failure and, as such, merit additional 
safety requirements and stipulations.  As a safety measure the UNP mandates that each 
pressurized system must have three mechanical inhibits; one of which must be failsafe. 
For the purposes of the MR SAT propulsion system, it was determined that two 
isolation valves would serve as the initial two inhibits with the thruster control valve 
serving as the final inhibit on each propellant line.  For simplicity sake, the two isolation 
valves were to be of the same design.  Therefore, the most important aspect of isolation 
valve selection was the failsafe nature of the chosen design.  In terms of valve design, 




in signal will shut off the flow and secure the propellant.  The overall requirements for 
the isolation valves can be found in Table 3.3. 
 
 
Table 3.3: Isolation Valve Requirements 
Requirement Reason 
Failsafe Design Safety feature prevents the release of propellant in the event of a failure.  Mandated by UNP. 
Sealant is low 
outgassing 
Low outgassing materials lose less matter when exposed 
to a vacuum.  Loss of material can lead to valve leakage 
and material deposits on other sensitive equipment.  
Additionally, low outgassing is mandated by UNP. 
Compatible with R-
134a 
R-134a is considered chemically inert, but can dissolve 
certain plastics and rubber materials.  Ensuring 
compatibility prevents seal failure. 





After an extensive search and consultation with experienced industry 
representatives, a micro-dispense solenoid valve from Lee Valve Company was selected.  
The original selected valve was the INKX0512050A, however, this valve was only proof 
tested to 199 MPa (289 psia) which does not meet the required FOS of 4.0.  Discussions 
with Lee yielded a derivative of the INKX0512050A valve that was slightly larger and 
proof tested to 5.17 MPa (750 psi).  Figure 3.4 shows the MR SAT isolation valve from 












Also discussed with Lee was the possibility of changing the internal sealant used 
within the valve to a material compatible with R-134a.  These discussions are still 
ongoing as a suitable material that is also low outgassing and moldable (per Lee 
manufacturing requirement) has yet to be found.  In the mean time, the valves were 
ordered with EPDM seals which are compatible with R-134a but have unknown 
outgassing properties.  Other pertinent valve characteristics are detailed in Table 3.4. 
3.3.1.3 Pressure regulator.  For peak performance, each thruster needs to be 
provided with constant and predictable flow characteristics.  Without regulated pressure, 
the flow delivered to the nozzle would change as tank pressure falls due to propellant use.  
Thus, the system requires a pressure regulator downstream of the tank for optimum 







Table 3.4:  MR SAT Valve Specifications [22] 
Mass 7 grams 
Proof Pressure (Lee Co. rating) 5.17 MPa (750 psi) 
Burst Pressure (Lee Co. rating) 7.76 MPa (1125 psi) 
Rated Thermal Environment -18 °C to 70 °C 
Open Response Time – 689.48 kPa (100 pisg) 0.25 ms 
Close Response Time – 689.48 kPa (100 pisg) < 3.0 ms 
Actuation Voltage  24 V spike 





Pressure regulators are in essence spring loaded check valves.  When the pressure 
downstream of the regulator exceeds a preset value, flow from upstream of the regulator 
is restricted; however, when the downstream pressure is below the set point, the regulator 
allows propellant to flow unimpeded.   
Any potential pressure regulator for the MR SAT propulsion system needed to 
meet two key parameters for consideration: a factory set regulated pressure (i.e. non-
adjustable) and be functional in vacuum.  While adjustable regulators would have 
allowed the downstream pressure to be optimized for most efficient thrust maneuvers, a 
concern was that during launch the excessive vibrations could cause the set point to vary 
and thus negate any possible advantage.  The need for vacuum functionality seems self-
explanatory; however, many regulators utilize vent holes to take atmospheric pressure 
into account and thus it was an important issue when sourcing viable pressure regulators.  








Table 3.5: Pressure Regulator Requirements 
Requirement Reason 
Non-adjustable Setting 
Adjustability increases component complexity.  
Set point could vary due to launch vibration.  
Requirement highly suggested by AFRL. 
Vacuum functionality Avoid vent holes which may lead to propellant leakage.   
Wetted surfaces compatible 
with R-134a 
Many regulators have internal components of 
plastic or rubber which must be compatible with 
the propellant 
Low pressure setting 
A lower regulated pressure reduces the impulse of 
each thruster firing, and thus allows for more 
precise maneuvers.  Also increases the time that 
tank pressure is above regulated pressure (i.e. 
regulators functional time). 
Reasonably priced 
The M SAT team was working on a budget and 
space rated components often were out of the 





Four companies were initially considered as vendors for the MR SAT pressure 
regulator; Moog, Beswick, Tescom, and Swagelok.  However, only the Swagelok 
regulator met all the requirements.  The Moog 50E741 pressure regulator had the benefit 
of being space rated, but was also excessively massive for a small satellite and cost 
upwards of $50,000.  The Beswick and Tescom regulators also failed to meet the 
subsystem’s guidelines by having a reference vent hole and an adjustment device, 
respectively.   
The Swagelok model chosen for use on MR SAT was the HFS3B compact 
pressure regulator designed for use with high flow gases.  The device was calibrated to a 
preset outlet pressure of 68.95 kPa (10 psig, 24.7 psia) and certified to work after 




additional benefit of easy integration since it was an inline model and could be equipped 




Table 3.6: MR SAT Pressure Regulator Specifications [22] 
Preset outlet pressure 68.95 kPa  (10 psig, 24.7 psia) 
Mass (measured)  176 grams 
Temperature range -40 °C to 70 °C 
Inlet pressure range Vacuum to 6.89 MPa (1000 psig) 
Operating temperature range  -23 °C to 65 °C 
Orifice size 3 mm (0.12 in) 
Flow capacity 100 std. L/min 
Leak rate (He) 1 x 10-9 std. cm3/sec 
 
 
3.3.1.4 Thrusters. The thrusters for the MR SAT propulsion system were to 
consist of three main components; a Swagelok fitting, an actuation valve, and a nozzle.  
Manufacturing the nozzle to the necessary tolerances and scale was determined to be 
beyond the fabrication abilities of M SAT design team, and as such, the thruster 
assemblies were to be internally designed and externally sourced.  Therefore, Micro 
Aerospace Solutions (MAS) a company in Melbourne, Florida with experience in micro 
propulsion systems was contacted by then Propulsion Lead, Carl Seubert to assist in the 
design and fabrication of the MR SAT thrusters.  
The valve component of the thruster assembly was chosen at the same time and in 
the same manner as the system isolation valves; thus the inhibit requirement was satisfied 
by the same valve model in all three cases.  The remaining design considerations for the 




thrusters, or how the three main components are configured within the assembly, was 
important for integration considerations.  Each thruster must be securely fixed to the 
satellite structure in the correct orientation which requires a method of attachment based 
upon the final configuration of the thruster.  The requirements pertaining to thruster 




Table 3.7: Configuration Requirements for Thruster Assembly 
Requirement Reason 
Provide means to secure thruster 
to structure 
Fixed orientation is necessary to ensure the 
system is capable of performing the required 
maneuvers correctly. 
Nozzle extends beyond 
honeycomb panels 
If the nozzle is obstructed by the honeycomb 
panels it will not be able to produce thrust.  
Also, the nozzle being merely even with the 
surface of the honeycomb panels could lead to 
solar cells being contaminated by R-134a. 
Allow for straightforward 
propellant line attachment 
The propellant lines must be connected to the 






An “L” shape with the bend placed between the Swagelok fitting and the valve, as 
seen in Figure 3.5, was chosen as the basic shape for the thruster assembly.  This allowed 
the thruster to be attached securely to the structure at the fitting, thus preventing 
unnecessary stress upon the thin and relatively delicate valve tubing.  With this 
configuration, the Swagelok fitting rests upon the inside surface of the isogrid panel 













Figure 3.6 shows the necessary dimensions for the thruster configuration to ensure 
the nozzle extends sufficiently past the solar panels.  Finally, this configuration allowed 
propellant lines to run along the inside surface of the isogrid panels, which provided a 
means to secure them as well.  While other configuration possibilities for the thruster 
assemblies do exist and could have worked equally well, they were not explored given 
sufficiency of this design.  
The nozzle portion of the thruster design was more complex as it was necessary to 
balance opposing performance requirements while designing a machinable part.  Analysis 
performed by Carl Seubert demonstrated improved ΔV performance for the system given 
a higher nozzle Aspect Ratio (AR), the ratio between nozzle exit area (Ae) and throat area 










However, this improvement comes at the expense of lower overall thrust 
produced per thruster firing which adversely affects the response times for attitude 
maneuvers [22].  Therefore, a compromise AR which extends mission life time, ΔV, 
while providing sufficient thrust for attitude control was a primary requirement for the 
nozzle design. 
Machining issues became prominent due to the small size and the necessary 
tolerances of the part to be machined.  The machining process greatly affected the final 
AR chosen for the nozzle since machining tolerances limit the minimum diameter 




inches (0.0254 mm) meaning that a part may vary plus or minus a thousandth of an inch 
off specified dimensions.  This is especially important for AT since as the throat area 
approaches the accuracy limit the variation in machining has a correspondingly greater 
influence on the performance of the nozzle.  The small part size also affects the 
complexity of the shape that can be attempted.  In larger parts, complex shapes involving 
relatively smooth curves are possible; however, when applied to smaller parts, the 
accuracy limit of the machining process could cause relatively large variations in the 
designed curvature.  Thus, simple nozzle shapes were necessary to prevent undue system 




Table 3.8: Nozzle Design Requirements 
Requirement Reason 
An AR that sufficiently meets 
all design requirements 
High AR gives higher ΔV but lower thrust.  A 
compromise which meets the needs and 
requirements of the mission is necessary. 
Machinable AT 
The AT must be much greater than the machining 
tolerances of MAS to reduce the influence of 
machining variability on system performance. 
Simple interior shape 
Complex interior surfaces are difficult to 
accurately manufacture due to the small part size.  
This in turn could lead to additional system losses 
due to friction and boundary layer affects. 
Stainless steel construction 
The thruster is likely to experience thermal 
gradients.  Using the same material in each 
component of the thruster assembly ensures 
thermal expansion rates should be similar and 
thus reduces the possibility of leaks and stress 








In consultation with MAS, the nozzle design was finalized and met all 
requirements placed upon it by the Propulsion subsystem.  The design called for a 
stainless steel converging/diverging nozzle utilizing straight cones in both the converging 
and diverging sections.  The straight cone shape is not as efficient as the bell-shaped 
section often seen in larger rocket nozzles, but is far easier to manufacture accurately.  
The diameter of the throat was set at 0.5 mm with the exit diameter set at 5 mm to ensure 
the structural strength of the outer edge.  Thus, the aspect ratio is 100, which is a fine 
compromise between ΔV and thrust as seen in Section 3.3.3 “Expected Performance.”  A 












3.3.1.5  Propellant lines and fittings.  Any pressurized system is only as robust 
as the lines, connections, and fittings used in its assembly.  They provide the means for 
propellant to flow from the source tank to thruster assemblies and eventually out the 
nozzle to produce thrust.  When developing the requirements for the propellant line 
system restrictions and recommendations from the UNP and AFRL officials played a 
significant role.  Many of the recommendations focused on practices known to reduce the 
possibility of propellant leakage within the system, a common problem with cold gas 
thrusters.   The requirements stemming from these recommendations and restrictions are 




Table 3.9: Propellant Line and Fitting Requirements 
Requirement Reason 
Lines and fittings must be 
constructed of metal 
Polymer or rubber propellant lines are more likely 
to fail especially under the vacuum conditions of 
space.  It is also an outgassing risk. 
Avoid use of flexible tubing 
This was more a suggestion as past use of flexible 
tubing, even of metal construction, has been shown 
to cause problems with connections and thus 
increased leak rates. 
Lines and fittings made of the 
same material 
Connections of different metals with different 
thermal expansion rates could lead to excess stress 
placed on the system or increased leak rates. 
Non-welded connections Welding performed by the team is against the policies of the UNP. 
Fittings and connections with 
low leak rates 
With the restriction on welded connections, 
compression fittings were the only choice left to the 
subsystem; however, choosing a compression fitting 
with a low leak rate is still prudent. 
Fittings must be able to fit on 
the isogrid panels 
Many of the panels are crowded with other system 
components and thus space is limited. 
Maintain a FOS of at least 
four over MEOP 
The propellant lines will experience the full 
pressure of the system and therefore must be able to 




There were many different types of fittings available for use in sealed systems 
such as the MR SAT propulsion system.  The majority of the connections within the 
system were to be tubing connections rather than threaded, and therefore compression 
fittings figured prominently in the product search.  At first Army/Navy (AN) standard 
37° flare fittings were considered for use with MR SAT propulsion.  These fittings 
require the end of the tubing to be flared out into a trumpet shape which is then fitted 
over a similarly shaped cone on the fitting.  A compression nut forces the cone into the 
flare and seals the connection.  A diagram of this arrangement can be seen in Figure 3.8.  
After consultation with AFRL personnel, the use of AN fittings was abandoned as 
previous satellite teams had had difficulty attaining a proper seal with their use.  Instead, 
AFRL officials suggested the use of Swagelok fittings which utilize a double ferrule 
design to both lock the tubing in place and seal the connection.  A schematic of this can 

















Aluminum tubing and 0.25 inch aluminum Swagelok fittings were sought for use 
with the propulsion system; however, two problems with this intent quickly became 
apparent.  First, after modeling the system with 0.25 inch fittings and tubing in NX3 it 
was clear that the fittings and tubing simply would not work within the satellite.  The 
fittings were too large to comfortably fit upon panels containing other subsystem 
components and the tubing required a minimum bend radius that also interfered with 
other components.  Secondly, many of the required fittings simply did not come with an 
option of aluminum construction.   
The final design utilized 0.125 inch OD (outside diameter) stainless steel tubing 




wall thickness of 0.02 inches making the tubing capable of handling up to 23,985.3 psia; 
well above the required FOS of 4.0. 
3.3.1.6 Tank and line heaters.  Two-phase storage of the propellant allows a 
greater propellant mass to be stored in an equivalent volume at a comparable pressure; 
however, before the liquid propellant can be effectively converted into thrust it must be 
transformed to the gaseous state.  Also, as propellant is expelled from the tank, both tank 
temperature and pressure decrease causing a loss of thruster efficiency and possibly 
leading to an interruption in propellant flow.  For these reasons, a method of adding 
energy into the system had to be devised in order to sustain the necessary phase change 
and maintain the thermodynamic conditions of the tank.  Additionally, the possibility of 
propellant condensation within the propellant lines had to be addressed and mitigated to 
ensure the maximum possible efficiency of the system.    
A minimum of two heaters were required by the system; one on the propellant 
tank to provide energy for the liquid to gas phase change, and the other situated upon the 
propellant line to help prevent re-condensation.  More heaters would more effectively 
prevent propellant condensation; however, such resistive heating consumes excessive 
amounts of electrical power.  At the time of heater selection, the power budget for MR 
SAT was uncertain with the exact available power unknown.  As a result, it was 
imperative to select heaters which utilized a minimum of electrical power while still 
maintaining the thermal control necessary for the M SAT mission.  The requirement for 






Table 3.10: Propellant Tank and Line Heater Requirements 
Requirement Reason 
Low power consumption The power of any satellite is limited and each component must minimize the power consumed. 
Made of low-outgassing 
material 
Low-outgassing materials are mandated by the 
UNP guidelines. 
Flexible material 
The heaters must be fixed to round components 
such as the propellant tank and propellant lines.  As 
such, they must be flexible to ensure efficient 
contact. 




The heaters chosen for use with the MR SAT propulsion system were developed 
by Minco.  The heaters are made of the polyimide film, Kapton, over a metallic heating 
element chosen to obtain the required resistance.  Kapton is widely used in the space 
industry for its low-outgassing properties.  Each heater also has an aluminum backing to 
ensure that the heaters conform to the curved surface of the tanks and lines.  Finally, the 
heaters are attached using an acrylic pressure-sensitive adhesive which also meets 
outgassing requirements and secured using shrink bands.  Heater specifications can be 














Voltage (V) Lead Gauge 
Tank 12.70 x 30.734 (5.00 x 12.10) 13.1 3.63 6.9 AWG 24 
Propellant 
Line 
0.864 x 8.814 





3.3.1.7 State sensors.  Throughout the mission, it would be useful to have an 
indication of how effectively the system is functioning.  This ensures that the propulsion 
system can adapt to changing situations and always operate at peak performance.  Both 
pressure and temperature sensors were to be incorporated within the propulsion system to 
constantly monitor state properties.  The temperature sensors fall under control of the 
Thermal subsystem, and as such, the input from the Propulsion subsystem was limited to 
number and location.  Two sensors will be placed on either end of the propellant tank to 
monitor the temperature shift as the system is utilized with another sensor located on the 
main propellant line.   
For the purposes of safety and thruster performance, pressure monitoring was 
imperative to the operation of the system.  Two pressure monitoring devices were needed 
for complete system coverage since two distinct pressure regimes are present: tank 
pressure and regulated pressure.  The most important aspect of pressure transducer design 
for the MR SAT propulsion system was the pressure range over which the transducer can 
accurately function.  The pressure range needed to be sufficiently wide to cover the entire 
spectrum of expected pressures while still being fine enough to ensure that there was 
adequate precision in the measurements.  At the time pressure transducer selection, the 
maximum expected operating pressure of the system was set at 100 psi and as a result the 
required maximum pressure was set at a mere 200 psi.  This and further requirements are 









Table 3.12: Pressure Transducer Requirements 
Requirement Reason 
Pressure range of 0-200 psia 
The smaller the pressure range the more precision 
the measuring instrument has.  Thus the requirement 
calls for a pressure range that easily contains the 
MEOP yet is small enough to remain precise. 
Lightweight The mass of the satellite is limited, and as such all components must be as light as possible. 
Stainless steel connections 
As explained previously, the use of similar materials 
at connection points will help alleviate the 





The AS17A model pressure transducer manufactured by Honeywell/Sensotec was 
selected for use with the MR SAT propulsion system.  While not space qualified, the 
AS17A model was developed specifically for aerospace applications and thus is 
relatively compact and light.  The standard model is capable of reading pressures up to 
10,000 psia but can be factory set to read a portion of this range thus increasing the 
precision of the measurement.  The two pressure transducers for MR SAT were set to an 
absolute range of 0 – 200 psia in accordance with the requirements in place at the time.  




Table 3.13:   Pressure Transducer Specifications [22] 
Pressure range 0 – 200 psia (0 – 1378.96 kPa) 
Mass 140 g 
Operating temperature range -54 °C – 121 °C 
Casing material Stainless Steel 
Connection type 7/16-20 UNF 







3.3.2. Component Arrangement.  Component arrangement encompassed two 
aspects of system design: the actual order of components within the propulsion system, 
i.e. along the propellant lines, and the layout or location of components within the 
satellite necessary for integration purposes.  The placement of each component, both 
within the propulsion system and within the satellite, could not be arbitrary, but rather 
had to satisfy a variety of requirements from NS4 guidelines to propulsion system 
requirements to even structural requirements for the satellite. 
3.3.2.1 Propellant line division.  The function of entire propulsion system is to 
efficiently transport propellant from the tank to the thruster assemblies in order to 
produce thrust.  With eight thrusters stemming from a single source tank, the main 
propellant line must split into eight branches.  The manner in which this split is 
accomplished greatly affects the final layout of the system.  Two methods were proposed: 
the utilization of a manifold design where the main line is split into eight individual lines 
through the use of one fitting and a fitting design which utilized a series of cross and tee 
fittings to split the lines to the requisite number.   
The manifold design offered many advantages with regard to integration and 
performance.  The main benefit realized would be the direct routing of propellant lines to 
each thruster and the corresponding reduction in connections.  Direct routing would 
allow, with careful design, the propellant lines to be relatively equal in length and thus 
equalize the performance losses associated with wall friction.  Uneven line lengths result 




experience vastly different performance.  Additionally, the propellant losses associated 
with connection leak rates would be reduced along with the number of connection points.     
Using a series of fittings to divide the branch lines offered a commercial off the 
shelf (COTS) option which would meet the requirements and needs of the propulsion 
system.  Under this plan, the main line would first be divided into three secondary lines 
by means of a cross fitting.  Five tee fittings are then used to further divide the lines into 
tertiary and quaternary lines.  The major benefit of this plan is the COTS nature of the 
components; however, this comes at the cost of ten extra connection points within the 
system and propellant lines of unequal length and complexity. 
Time and budgetary constraints lead to the manifold option being downgraded to 
a long-term research project.  During the NS4 competition research into manifold design 
determined that no COTS manifold with eight outlet ports could be sourced.  Such a 
manifold would have to be custom designed and manufactured to meet the specifications 
of the MR SAT propulsion system.  While this would be possible, the added time and 
inherent expense made this option unsuitable for implementation during the NS4 
competition.   Therefore, the series of Swagelok fittings was employed as seen in Figure 
3.10. 
3.3.2.2 Component order.  Each component for the propulsion system was 
carefully chosen to meet the requirements set forth by the Propulsion subsystem; 
component placement within the propulsion system was just as important to the overall 
functionality of the system.  With the basic propellant line structure established, the other 




of each component had to satisfy the requirements of the overall system and the UNP, the 
placement of each component had to contribute to the realization of system requirements.  
Many of these components required integration before the main line split so that they 
were effective for the entire propulsion system.  Additionally, the position of components 











The isolation valves are prime examples of components that seemingly could be 
placed anywhere within the system as long as program requirements are met; and yet, 
must be incorporated prior to the main line division point for efficient design.  NS4 
guidelines only stipulate that each path of a pressurized system must have three 
independent inhibits; however, the placement of isolation valves greatly determines the 
number of valves needed to attain the three inhibit status.  For example, if only a single 
isolation valve is placed along the main line, a total of sixteen valves would have to be 
integrated into the branch lines to maintain the three inhibits.  Thus by incorporating both 
isolation valves on the main line the total number of valves required for the propulsion 
system is reduced by seven. 
With all the functional components needing to be placed along the main line, the 
relative location of each had to be determined.  The function of each part was the 
determining factor for its location.  For instance, the first isolation valve is intended to 
isolate the propellant tank from the rest of the system prior to the initiation of formation 
flight and as such needs to be close to the tank on the main line.  However, the pressure 
maintained within the propellant tank needs to be constantly monitored which means one 
of the pressure transducers must be placed before the first isolation valve.  In the same 
way, the final pressure transducer must be located just after the pressure regulator device 
or else it would be incapable of determining the regulated pressure.  Finally, the line 
heater must be placed where the greatest possibility of propellant condensation occurs.  
The main concern with regard to propellant condensation was due to long term propellant 




integrated just preceding the regulator.  Thus combining the layout of the main line with 









3.3.2.3 Naming convention.  Each part and connection must be individually 
identifiable and trackable so that torque logs and part logs can be filled out.  Such logs 
are mandated by UNP and are a method to catalog and document pertinent information 
concerning the safety and usability of components throughout their lifetime.   Therefore, 
a naming convention had to be implemented to distinguish otherwise indistinguishable 
parts and connections.   
The easiest way to implement a naming convention in a rational and systematic 
manner was to base each part name on component type and location along the propellant 
line.  The first step, then, was to systematically name each branch line.  To begin the 




Line.  Each secondary line was then numbered starting with the left most line stemming 
from the diverging point when seen from above (see Figure 3.12) and continuing 
clockwise.  Tertiary lines were given a letter beginning with “a” attached to the moniker 










Parts and tubing were then named based upon the location of said part along each 
of the various branch lines.  The final name consisted of three parts; one or two letters 
identifying component type, line name, and number of that particular component type 
along that line.  For example, the tee fitting connecting the downstream pressure 




“ML” signifies that the fitting is on the main line, and “02" indicates that it is the second 
tee fitting on the line.   Figure 3.13 depicts each component and its corresponding name 
within the propulsion system. 
3.3.2.4 System integration.  Transforming the two-dimensional basic component 
order into a three dimensional system integration plan required consultation with both the 
structures and integration subsystems to ensure that the system fit within the confines of 
MR SAT and met all requisite structural guidelines.  Discussions focused on two key 
areas: the integration of the core hardware, i.e. the propellant tank and main line 
hardware, and the integration of the thruster assemblies and propellant lines onto the 
isogrid panels.   
The core hardware represented the majority of the mass and volume of the MR 
SAT propulsions system.  Its placement was also the initial task for the integration of the 
propulsion system into MR SAT beginning with tank placement.  Due to the variable 
nature of propellant tank mass (i.e. the mass changes as propellant is expelled), the 
placement of the tank can affect the motion of the satellite CG during the mission.  
Ideally, the CG of the tank would be placed at the CG of the satellite to limit the change 
of CG throughout the mission; however, due to the dimensions of the propellant tank and 
the placement of other satellite components this was neither practical nor structurally 
feasible.  Therefore, the tank was placed along the bottom panel of MR SAT with the 












satellite.  The orientation was particularly important in terms of integration since the 
cross corner span of the satellite represents the greatest linear distance along the bottom 
panel. Thus, even with specialized fittings attached to the outlet of the propellant tank the 
propellant lines still remain within the interior of the satellite.   
Stemming from the propellant tank is the main line of the propulsion system.  As 
originally designed, a specially designed Swagelok elbow fitting immediately directed 
the main line from the propellant tank down to the base plate of MR SAT.  From there 
the line angled in along the side of the tank to a tee fitting connected to the first pressure 
transducer.  After the first isolation valve, the line bent 90 degrees upward where the 
pressure regulator and second pressure transducer were integrated into a tower.  Finally, 
the line bent another 90 degrees to run along the top panel where the second isolation 
valve was incorporated.  A CAD model of this set-up is shown in Figure 3.14. 
The problem with this arrangement was structural in nature.  The tower of 
components had no support structure in place to balance the mass of the components and 
prevent launch vibrations from tearing the components apart.  Various solutions and 
adaptations were proposed that maintained the same basic tower structure yet attempted 
to provide the components added support by incorporating support rods or even tying 
components into special support structures added to the nearby component boxes within 
MR SAT.  However, these options were not optimal solutions and the subsystem began 













The challenge of developing a core hardware configuration where all components 
have sufficient structural support was one of limited space and attachment points within 
the satellite.  With the propellant tank occupying most of the bottom panel and 
component boxes limiting the available space along the side panels, the only accessible 
space for the main line components is the area directly above the propellant tank.  There 
were no natural attachment points within this region but a support structure could be 
incorporated into the propellant tank mounts that would allow the main line components 
to wrap around the tank. 
This support structure consisted of two specially designed tank mounts and a 
mounting bridge that spans the gap between the two mounts.  The tank mounts each had a 




bolted to the bottom plate of MR SAT.  The mounting bracket on the outlet side of the 
tank was equipped with two lipped shelves slanted at a downward 45 degree angle.  
These shelves were designed to serve as mounting brackets which completely support the 
mass of the two pressure transducers.  Each tank mount was also fitted with a raised 
platform serving as the integration point for the mounting bridge.  The mounting bridge 
was a thin piece of aluminum with two sets of pronged attachment points stemming from 










With this support arrangement, the main line is directed upward upon leaving the 
tank and angled over into the run end of a tee fitting.  Fitted to the branch end of the tee is 




transducer is supported.  From there, the line continues to the first isolation valve which 
is supported by two prongs of the mount bridge.  The line then wraps around to the other 
side of the tank where the pressure regulator is also supported by the mounting bridge.  
Next, the line is attached to the branch end of a tee fitting which is angled so that the runs 
lay along the sloped supports of the tank mount.  The final pressure transducer connects 
to the downward angled run of the tee fitting leaving the main line to continue at an 
upward angle to the top panel of MR SAT where the final isolation valve is connected 
running parallel to the tank.  Figure 3.16 represents the core hardware configuration used 
for MR SAT with an adaptation of the propellant line between the first isolation valve 
and the regulator to provide the four inches of straight tubing required for line heater 
integration. 
The integration of thruster assemblies and propellant lines into the satellite posed 
the same challenges of design encountered during the core hardware configuration.  As 
discussed earlier in this section, eight thruster assemblies had to be incorporated into the 
satellite at specific locations to attain the performance goals of the propulsion system.  
Simply integrating the thrusters themselves onto the various isogrid panels would have 
been challenging enough given the limited available space; however, the thrusters are not 
self contained units and must be connected to propellant lines and fittings which both 
require extra space and efficient placement.   
Mindful of the integration of other satellite components, the original propellant 
line design avoided the center of isogrid panels and limited connections on the top panel 











In Figure 3.17 the main line continues from the core hardware into a Swagelok cross 
fitting on the top panel of MR SAT.  From there the three secondary lines diverge along 
the edges of the top panel to the second group of diverging points in the form of tee 
fittings located along the edges of the isogrid panels.  Figure 3.18 shows a close up of 
Panel 1 with its four thrusters integrated. 
The major difficulty with this routing of propellant lines was the unanticipated 
interference the lines and fittings cause in the assembly of the MR SAT structure.  In 
attempting to avoid component boxes in the center of the panels, the routing plan 
inadvertently covered panel attachment points and interfered with bolt patterns.  Also, 




propellant lines to avoid interference with component boxes.  Thus a rerouting of 










To avoid component and assembly interference, the propellant lines were rerouted 
with more of the fittings attached to the top panel.  Propellant lines were pulled away 
from the isogrid panels in some instances to avoid connection points and account for the 
minimum bend radius of the tubing.  This was especially true on Panel 1 where the 
diverging point was moved off the panel to the top panel of MR SAT and the line 










Finally, the corner thrusters were moved from the middle of the corner to one side 
so they could be attached to a single panel instead of strung between panels.  Figure 3.19 
shows the final MR SAT propulsion system. 
3.3.3. Expected Performance.  Performance is the driving objective of the design 
process, and as such a method of objectively determining the performance of the system 
as designed was required.  Modeling a two-phase system proved to be a difficult task 
since the added variables and possibility of condensation quickly complicated the 
mathematical equations.  Therefore, assumptions were used to simplify the modeling 
equations yet still take into account worst-case conditions.  A more detailed description 




“Refrigerant Based Propulsion System for Small Spacecraft;” however, the basic 









To employ the rocket flow equations, basic assumptions had to be made.  These 
include: 
• Isentropic nozzle flow 
• Isothermal fluid in tank and propellant lines 




• Nozzle flow is free of discontinuities and/or shockwaves 
• Flow is axially uniform with negligible boundary layer 
• Steady flow with no transient effects due to valve opening/closing 
While many of these assumptions are valid given the right operating conditions, 
others such as the negligible boundary layer are less valid and must be taken into account 
in the form of correction factors applied to the equations.  For the final flow conditions, a 
pressure loss of 10 psi from regulated pressure (i.e. the nozzle is exposed to a pressure of 
14.7 psi) was implemented to account for flow losses due to friction and any leaks 
present in the system.  Additionally, it was assumed only 90% of the gas pressure could 
be effectively converted into thrust with the last 10% being lost to leaks and/or 
insufficient pressure to be expelled from the tank.  Finally, the propellant temperature 
was set to 15 °C which gives a more conservative estimate of thruster performance and 
takes into account the possibility that the system heaters may not be able to maintain the 
propellant at the target temperature of 20 °C.   
Given these conditions, the system performance was computed for three possible 
tank pressures.  The three pressures chosen account for the sealed container requirement 
of NS4 and the advantages that could be realized if higher pressures could be 
implemented.  The thrust performance is recorded in Table 3.14 and the system 











Table 3.14:  Predicted Thrust Performance 
ISP 43.71 sec 
Thrust 37.37 mN 





Table 3.15:  Predicted ΔV Performance for Three Pressure Regimes 
Max Tank Pressure 
at 100 °C (psi) 
ΔV 
(m/s) 
Total Thrust Exhaust 
Duration (min) 
100 0.935 11.34 
200 2.024 24.52 




3.4. CONCEPTUAL OPERATION 
The overall performance of the propulsion system and the satellite as a whole can 
depend greatly on how and when various mission tasks are initiated and performed.  
Conceptual operations allow for mission planning to take into account multiple mission 
conditions and develop contingency plans to deal with suboptimal conditions.  While all 
operating conditions have not been explored, a basic operation plan for the M SAT 
mission has been developed.  The use of the propulsion system within this plan is 
discussed in the following sections. 
3.4.1. Modes of Operation.  The Modes of Operation were developed by the M-
SAT leadership as a mission timeline to aid in planning.  The Modes are a sequence of 
major phases within the mission that are further subdivided into general tasks to be 
performed by the satellite in order to accomplish the goals of that phase.  The entire 
mission is divided into 11 major phases with additional safe modes established should 




operation modes including Initialization, Detumble, Separation, and Formation Flight.  
However, under nominal conditions, the system will only fire during the Formation Flight 
phase of the mission.  During both the Initialization and Separation modes, the propulsion 
system tasks are limited to monitoring pressure and temperature and ensuring that the 
system is prepared to function during the following phase.  The propulsion system will 
remain on standby during the Detumble mode as a backup system in case the coils cannot 
adequately control the satellite; however, should the propulsion system have to be used at 
this early junction, the formation flight portion of the mission will be adversely affected 
due to the expended propellant. 
3.4.2. Stand-by Operations.  The major task for the propulsion subsystem when 
not engaged in propulsive maneuvers is to maintain the ability of the system to perform 
when required.  This involves continually monitoring the system for pressure and 
temperature variations and applying active controls in the form of heaters when 
applicable.  Maintaining the set temperature is particularly important to system function 
as the expulsion of propellant from the tank can quickly reduce the temperature of the 
propellant to the point where phase change cannot occur and propellant flow would be 
interrupted.   
3.4.3. Mechanics of Thruster Firing.  There are two ways in which the 
propulsion system can be configured to operate during a firing sequence.  The first 
method has the last two inhibit levels within the propulsion system initially closed.  
When a thruster tasking is implemented, both valves are opened, starting with the 
isolation valve, in a pulsed fashion allowing propellant to flow down from the regulator 




half of the propulsion system is maintained.  Thus should a small leak be experienced 
downstream of the second isolation valve (where the majority of the connections are), the 
propulsion system is not continually feeding propellant to the leaky fitting during long 
pauses between firings.  However, this method invalidates the assumption of steady flow 
since transient conditions would exist in the line due to opening of the valve. 
The second has both isolation valves maintained in the open position during 
formation flight.  To execute a maneuver, therefore, would only require the opening of 
the specific thruster or thrusters necessary to produce the required force or torque and 
powering up the tank heater to ensure phase transition.  Under this method, the propellant 
lines downstream of the regulator are kept at a constant pressure in between propulsive 
maneuvers and thus the steady flow assumption utilized in the model is more justifiable 
as long as sufficient time elapses between thruster firings.  Currently, this is the method 
set to be used during the MR SAT mission; however, system level testing will determine 




4. HAZARD ANALYSIS 
4.1. PURPOSE 
Safety is of the utmost concern when developing and constructing a satellite.  
Hazards present serious risks to personnel and equipment, and yet are possible in all 
engineered systems.  Identification of all such hazards within a system is the only 
possible way to ensure that proper mitigation efforts are in place.  In a two-phase 
propulsion system such hazards may be caused by natural thermodynamic events (i.e. 
temperature changes due to ambient conditions) or component failures.  The hazard 
analysis undertaken by the M-SAT Propulsion Subsystem sought to identify the hazards 
associated with the system during all phases of construction and operation in order to 
ensure the mitigation efforts, including component redesign and procedure 
implementation, were sufficient to guarantee the safety of all personnel and equipment.   
4.2. PROPULSION SAFETY ASSESSMENT WHITE PAPER 
The hazard assessment for the MR SAT propulsion system began during the NS4 
competition in the form of the Safety Assessment White Paper (SAWP) written jointly by 
the three universities pursuing refrigerant based propulsion systems.  The Missouri S & 
T-led consortium included members of the University of Texas at Austin and the 
Washington University in Saint Louis NS4 design teams.  The stated purpose of the 
SAWP was to lay forth the foundations for a new type of cold gas propulsion based upon 
refrigerant propellants stored in a saturated-liquid state.  The foundational aspect of the 
paper was meant to address concerns of AFRL officials by evaluating the need, design 




4.2.1. Paper Specified Temperature Range.  The most extreme temperature and 
pressure conditions the propulsion system must be designed to meet will occur on-orbit. 
After consultation with the UNP program managers, -50 °C to 100 °C was deemed a 
conservative and appropriate range of expected temperatures for nanosatellites in low 
Earth orbit. 
The conservative nature of the specified range was confirmed in the SAWP 
through the analysis of telemetry data collected during various heritage satellite missions.  
For example, the AMSAT-OSCAR 7, a 28.6 kg satellite launched into high LEO orbit in 
1974, experienced on-orbit temperatures ranging from 8.5 °C to 35.1 °C.  Additionally, 
the range selected for use in the white paper was found to be more conservative than the 
thermal test range (-35 to 75 °C) currently employed by NASA for unmanned spacecraft 
[24].   
The selection of such a conservative thermal range, particularly the high upper 
limit, has a direct impact on the hazard analysis of the system.  Given the variable nature 
of propellant state within the specified temperature range, worst case scenarios, i.e. 
scenarios utilizing the extremes of the range, dominate the analyzed hazards.   
4.2.2. Focus of SAWP Hazard Analysis.  A typical hazard analysis focuses on 
specific physical systems; however, such was not the case with the hazard analysis 
associated with the NS4 Propulsion White Paper.  Each member university of the 
consortium had designed and was in the process of implementing a unique refrigerant-
based propulsion system within their specific satellite.  Therefore, it was impossible to 




system.  Instead, a general system was analyzed for hazards associated solely with the 
unique propellant.   
Under this guideline, hazards are not associated with a specific component failure, 
instead, how a change in the propellant affects the rest of the system is evaluated; e.g., an 
increase in propellant pressure could cause the tank to rupture.  Due to the somewhat 
unspecific nature of the hazards, mitigation efforts described within the SAWP were 
presented in the form of design guidelines and suggested practices rather than specific 
component remedies.  
4.2.3. SAWP Hazard Classification System.  To begin the safety assessment, a 
hazard classification system was developed based on suggestions from AFRL mentors as 
follows: 
 
• Catastrophic - A Catastrophic Hazard is defined as any single or multiple 
system failure which has the potential to cause damage/harm not only to 
the spacecraft, but to surrounding equipment/personnel as well.  
• Critical - A Critical Hazard is defined as any system failure which results 
in damage/harm to the spacecraft and/or has the potential to negatively 
impact mission objectives to the point of failure.  
• Tolerable - A Tolerable Hazard is defined as any system failure which 
results in minimal damage to the spacecraft/mission.  
 
Based on these definitions, hazards are classified not by the likelihood of their 




hazards can be ranked on a relative scale, and the impact of each identified; thus enabling 
proper design choices to be made.   
However, in discounting the probability of hazard occurrence and the possibility 
of mitigation efforts, the classification system makes nearly impossible to design and fly 
a system free of catastrophic hazards.  Thus, the additional classification of Acceptable 
Risk for Flight, as designated below, was necessary as justification for the inclusion of 
catastrophic hazards within flight-ready designs. 
• Acceptable Risk for Flight - Acceptable Risk for Flight is defined as 
operating the system with known hazards classified as Tolerable or with 
hazards which can be mitigated to tolerable levels by use of the 
appropriate safety devices and measures. 
4.2.4. SAWP Hazard Analysis.  The general design of any propulsion system 
contains many possible hazards within each classification.  In most cases, propellant is 
initially stored in a small, pressurized vessel and from there distributed to the thrusters by 
means of tubing.  By taking into account mission objectives, a prototype design can be 
developed; however, before the design can be further refined, the safety assessment must 
be completed to ensure selected components meet the mitigation criteria.  
4.2.4.1  Catastrophic hazards.  The greatest risk inherent to the system comes 
from uncontrolled and unexpected changes in the state of the propellant.  The 
catastrophic hazard is directly caused by an increase in system temperature, but may have 
many indirect causes.  As a result of this increase, the pressure of the propellant could 




which in turn could lead to increased leak rates and/or system rupture.  The use of storage 
tanks defined as pressure vessels greatly amplifies the effects of burst since they contain 
enough internal energy to seriously impact the surrounding area.  Both passive and active 
methods of mitigation are available to combat the adverse effects of pressure increase.  
The first passive measure is simply designing the storage vessel with a sufficiently large 
factor of safety to withstand any fluctuations within the system.  Also, the system should 
be designed to be leak-before-burst; thus alleviating dangerous over-pressurization 
through low energy fluid discharge rather than an explosive release of energy.  The active 
method uses sensors to monitor system conditions and discharges the system once 
dangerous levels have been reached.   
Another consequence of a rise in temperature is encountered within the system 
materials.  Many materials, metallic in particular, expand and contract with changes in 
temperature causing increased stress at connection points.  If these stresses are not 
accounted for in the design of the system, increased leak rates and/or rupture could occur.  
Additionally, if materials with dissimilar thermal expansion rates are used at connection 
points, the possibility of mission damaging leaks increases many fold.  Two possible 
sources of differing thermal properties are the use of multiple materials (e.g. aluminum 
connected to steel) and the existence of thermal gradients between connected 
components. To guard against the possible consequences of thermal expansion, proper 
material selection must be performed with particular attention to obtaining sufficient 
yield and fracture stress properties, and if possible, avoiding the use of dissimilar 




Finally, under drastic conditions and extreme temperatures, the selected 
refrigerants have the added hazard of decomposition and even the possibility of auto-
ignition.  Decomposition of R-134a and R-123 occurs at temperatures above 250°C and 
auto ignition at or above 743°C and 770°C, respectively.  All values are well above the 
expected temperature range; however, the seriousness of the consequences produced by 
this hazard merits mention.  Both refrigerants decompose into highly volatile and caustic 
chemicals, such as hydrofluoric acid, which can cause serious burns and compromise 
equipment.  Care should be taken during construction and storage of the satellite so 
propellant does not come into contact with excessive heat such as open flames. 
When dealing with pressure vessels, structural strength of the selected material is 
of the utmost importance.  However, merely designing to worst-case scenarios is no 
guarantee of successfully avoiding structural failure since thermal cycling has, in addition 
to those risks associated with the corresponding maximum and minimum temperatures, 
the potential to cause structural failures due to thermal fatigue.  Temperature fluctuations 
for a two-phase propellant system can occur due to both system and environmental 
influences.  During propulsive maneuvers the endothermic phase change lowers the 
overall system temperature. Environmental factors, such as leaving and entering eclipse, 
can also cycle system temperatures.  To avoid thermal fatigue, it is first necessary to 
thermally insulate the system through use of MLI which will greatly reduce the effects of 
the spacecraft’s environment.  To reduce the effect of system processes, system 
monitoring and some method of energy addition to the system (i.e. heaters) are required.  




phase change and minimize thermal gradients.  Finally, system materials should be 
chosen in such a way as to limit the effects of thermal cycling where possible.  
4.2.4.2  Critical hazards. Catastrophic hazards may pose the greater threat to 
surrounding equipment and personnel; however, critical hazards are no less destructive to 
mission success.  As with hazards classified as catastrophic, critical hazards are often 
products of the propellant state whereas mitigation methods normally center on proper 
component selection and procedures. 
The effects of a temperature decrease within the system represent a critical hazard 
rather than catastrophic as the internal energy contained within the system is far less than 
that for the case of temperature increase.  As such, the overall magnitude of possible 
consequence for any resulting failure is less.  This does not mean, however, that thermal 
decrease can be ignored. Any substantial decrease in the temperature of the fluid will 
result in a phase change.  If the temperature falls to the freezing point of the propellant, 
the fluid will solidify. The effectiveness of the propulsion system’s internal mechanisms 
will be reduced with a potential of damage to internal mechanics of the tank if any of the 
solid propellant shifted.  However, the system need not reach the propellant freezing 
point in order for a hazard to be present since there exists the potential for system 
materials to experience reduced structural integrity (brittleness) due to the low 
temperatures generated by the fluid.  Also, as with thermal expansion, thermal 
contraction can lead to propellant leakage and eventual mission failure if different 
contraction rates exist between components.  Mitigation efforts should include system 




system materials should be selected to avoid mismatched thermal contraction rates and 
materials which can become brittle within the expected temperature range.  
Temperature and pressure are not the only propellant properties to consider during 
a hazard analysis; the material compatibility and potential for chemical reactivity are also 
a concern.  While refrigerants are generally chemically inert, as previously mentioned 
there are certain substances with which a negative reaction can occur.  Any system 
material should be thoroughly researched for its compatibility with the chosen propellant.  
System materials which have direct contact with the propellant must have a zero to very 
low reactivity rating to ensure continued system functionality.  When determining an 
acceptable degradation rate, mission length should be accounted for with appropriate 
margins.  For shorter missions, a somewhat faster reaction rate might be acceptable so 
long as mission goals are not negatively impacted; however, longer missions require 
much lower reactivity.  Materials with no or limited exposure to the fluid under normal 
operating conditions must also be considered since any leaks could bring said material in 
contact with the propellant. To prevent harm to equipment and personnel, any material 
reactions determined to be explosive or combustible require the selection of a different 
material. Where material reselection is not possible, such as on board the launch vehicle, 
it is important to make sure the system has minimum leakage to lessen the chance of 
reaction with an unknown material.  
4.2.4.3  Tolerable hazards.  Throughout ground operations, there is the 
possibility of exposure to the propellant which is a tolerable hazard that can be avoided. 




a symptom of chemical exposure to the refrigerants, while frostbite results from the low 
temperature nature of the refrigerant. Asphyxiation is possible if proper venting is not 
present during the discharge of any propellant. Personnel should be required to wear 
suitable protective clothing and eyewear. In addition approved ventilation and warnings 
should be instituted in the work environments where potential exposure to the propellant 
can occur. 
4.2.4.4 Hazard classification matrix.  The hazard analysis for the SAWP was 
put into a classification matrix in order for the identified hazards to easily be classified 
and associated with the required mitigation methods.  The resulting catalog of hazards is 




Table 4.1: SAWP Hazard Classification Matrix 






























Table 4.1 SAWP Hazard Classification Matrix (Cont.) 



























factor of safety 














































Table 4.1 SAWP Hazard Classification Matrix (Cont.) 









leads to possible 
rupture 
Proper selection 
of tank materials 
and 
minimization of 
















with large factor 














































Table 4.1 SAWP Hazard Classification Matrix (Cont.) 






Catastrophic Risks of system 
pressure increase 
 

































































Catastrophic Possible fire 


















4.2.4.5 SAWP hazard analysis conclusion.  Ideally speaking, only systems 
containing no hazards classified greater than tolerable would be considered for flight; 
however, given the nature of spacecraft design, this is not always possible.  Since the 
classification of a hazard is based not on the likelihood of its occurrence but on the 
potential harm the hazard could produce, even after mitigation some hazards cannot be 
reclassified.  Mitigation efforts can, however, reduce the possibility of such an adverse 
event and even lessen the potential harm to both equipment and personnel.  To represent 
an acceptable risk for flight, all hazards within a system must be acknowledged and 
addressed by implementing the proper mitigation methods.  Those hazards which cannot 
be reclassified do not preclude a system from flight if ground and launch personnel are 
aware of the potential danger and can execute the necessary procedures to prevent the 
occurrence. 
4.2.5.  AFRL Approval for the SAWP.   After completion, the SAWP was 
presented to AFRL officials for final approval of the document and thus their tacit 
approval of the foundations and guidelines within the paper.  Two separate levels of 
approval were sought by the consortium; approval of concept and approval of design 
constraints.  Approval of concept covers the idea that refrigerant based cold gas 
propulsion systems are not inherently unsafe and can be implemented under the UNP.  
AFRL approval of the design constraints developed in the SAWP would imply that 
systems designed within the specifications of the SAWP would meet safety guidelines 
and be permitted to fly. 
Top level analysis of the SAWP by AFRL officials found the paper to be well 




gas thrusters and that such thruster systems were not innately in violation of UNP 
policies.  However, final approval for the document was not granted due to lack of 
specifics within the design and hazard analysis portions.  AFRL safety officials were 
looking for assurances within the paper that each propulsion system had been designed 
and implemented in a safe manner.  Due to the general nature of the paper such 
assurances were impossible.  Additionally, safety officials took exception to the 
“Acceptable Risk for Flight” definition; stating that catastrophic hazards are generally not 
acceptable flight risks and that mitigation efforts or design changes are necessary to 
remove said hazards from the system.   
4.3. SCOPE OF HAZARD ANALYSIS   
Addressing the concerns of AFRL officials in terms of the M SAT propulsion 
system required a shift in focus away from the previous consortium of universities and 
toward a system tailored hazard analysis.  The analysis must strive to discover, classify, 
and correct all potential hazards to personnel and equipment.  As such, the analysis 
cannot merely be based upon hazards present in the final product, but also must take into 
account hazards present during all phases of construction and operation.    
Therefore, the second hazard analysis undertaken by the M SAT Propulsion 
subsystem sought to identify and mitigate hazardous situations during all phases of 
design, construction, and operation with particular attention to possible situations which 




4.4. TYPES OF HAZARD ANALYSIS 
Multiple hazard analysis methodologies were explored for possible adaptation to 
the needs of the M SAT Propulsion hazard analysis.  The methods researched basically 
fell into one of two categories: a “What if?” method where the analysis is performed by 
determining the consequence of the realization of component failure modes and a more 
quantitative analysis based upon the given rate of component failure and the effect of said 
failure upon system operation.   
The quantitative analysis has the benefit of being a far more thorough analysis 
method that utilizes manufacturer’s component failure rates to determine the probability 
of hazard occurrence.  Additionally, the consequences of the hazard on the system are 
quantitatively described through simulation; thus, allowing for the quantitative 
assignment of severity levels.  The major drawback of such an analysis is its time and 
labor intensive nature.  While not as thorough as the more quantitative analysis, the 
“What if” type of analysis has the major benefit of low personnel cost.  As both time and 
personnel are legitimate concerns for the M SAT team, a “What if” style hazard analysis 
was deemed adequate for the purposes of the M SAT Propulsion subsystem. 
4.5. DEFINING A HAZARD CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 
The shortfall of the previous classification system was that it failed to take into 
account the probability of hazard occurrence and thus limited the manners in which 
catastrophic hazards could be addressed.  Therefore, a new system of classification that 
still accounted for hazard severity yet also incorporated hazard probability was required.  




was drawn from NASA and DOD documents concerning hazard analysis 
implementation. 
Under the new system, the measure of severity definitions remain relatively 




Table 4.2.  Hazard Severity Classifications [25] 
Description Category Environmental, Safety, and Health Result Criteria 
Catastrophic I 
Could result in death, permanent total disability, loss 
exceeding $1M, or irreversible severe environmental 
damage that violates law or regulation. 
Critical II 
Could result in permanent partial disability, injuries or 
occupational illness that may result in hospitalization of at 
least three personnel, loss exceeding $200K but less than 
$1M, or reversible environmental damage causing a 
violation of law or regulation. 
Marginal III 
Could result in injury or occupational illness resulting in 
one or more lost work days(s), loss exceeding $10K but 
less than $200K, or mitigatible environmental damage 
without violation of law or regulation where restoration 
activities can be accomplished. 
Negligible IV 
Could result in injury or illness not resulting in a lost work 
day, loss exceeding $2K but less than $10K, or minimal 





 Probability of occurrence was taken into account by implementing a secondary set 
of classifications indicating the frequency the hazardous situation is likely to occur.  
These definitions are given in Table 4.3. 
The two classifications are then combined within a Risk Assessment Matrix 
(RAM) to yield the Risk Assessment Code (RAC) associated with each hazard.  The 




Table 4.3: Probability Estimate Classification [25] 
Description Category Applicable Criteria 
Frequent A 
Likely to occur often during the operational lifetime 
of the system, with a probability of occurrence 
greater than 10-1 in that life. 
Probable B 
Will occur several times during the operational 
lifetime of the system, with a probability of 
occurrence less than 10-1 but greater than 10-2 in that 
life. 
Occasional C 
Likely to occur sometime during the operational 
lifetime of the system, with a probability of 
occurrence less than 10-2 but greater than 10-3 in that 
life. 
Remote D 
Unlikely but possible to occur in the life of an item, 
with a probability of occurrence less than 10-3 but 




Table 4.4:  Risk Assessment Matrix 
 Frequent Probable Occasional Remote 
Catastrophic 1 1 2 3 
Critical 1 2 3 3 
Marginal 2 3 4 4 





The different RACs attached to each identified hazard speak to the flight 
acceptability of said hazard.  The definitions for RACs 1-4 are as follows: 
• RAC 1 – The hazard presents an imminent danger and unacceptable risk 
for flight.  Mitigation efforts must be implemented (preferably in the form 




• RAC 2 – The hazard presents a serious danger to surrounding equipment 
and personnel.  The hazard is an unacceptable risk for flight and 
mitigation efforts must be implemented. 
• RAC 3 – The hazard is an acceptable flight risk yet should be addressed 
with applicable mitigation procedures if possible. 
• RAC 4 – The hazard is an acceptable flight risk with current controls. 
4.6. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
Hazard identification is an important step in the analysis process.  To begin the 
process of hazard identification, the failure modes of each component within the system 
were delineated.  Any event, defect, or deviation from nominal component performance 
which has the potential to adversely affect mission goals or cause dangerous situations is 
deemed a failure mode of said component.  For example, the elbow fitting attached to the 
propellant tank has two identified failure modes: component leak and component burst.  
However, to account for hazards not associated merely with component failure, the 
identification process was extended to the different phases of the propulsion project 
beginning with the construction phase.  Within the various phases of the project, the 
hazards present are mainly procedural in nature rather than component related.  To 
identify these hazards, the procedures were analyzed for hazardous situations and 
potential errors in implementation which could result in future hazards. 
4.7. HAZARD ANALYSIS 
With hazards present within the system identified, the analysis portion of the 




which could lead to the occurrence of said failure mode.  The probability of hazard 
occurrence was then assessed by analyzing the pertinent data such as Factors of Safety 
and available data on component failure rates.  Finally, the consequences of occurrence 
were evaluated and described in order to judge the severity classification necessary for 
the failure mode.   
The next step in the analysis process was the assignment of the initial Risk 
Assessment Code for each identified hazard based on the method described in Section 
4.5.  Finally, controls and mitigation efforts were considered and the RAC adjusted to 
correspond with the new severity and probability classifications.  The resulting hazard 
analysis can be found in the appendix. 
4.8. MITIGATION: DESIGN VS. PROCEDURE 
When confronting a possible hazard, the primary goal of the system designer 
should be to eliminate the hazard through a redesign process or implement automatic 
controls within the system that remove the probability of hazard occurrence.  This 
provides the safest means for continued operation of the system; however, under certain 
circumstances the hazard cannot be wholly removed from the system and in such 
instances procedures must be implemented to mitigate the risk.   
4.9. HAZARD ANALYSIS CONCLUSIONS 
The completed hazard analysis for the M SAT propulsion system demonstrates 
the inherent safety of the system.  As designed, or with the implementation of proper 
handling procedures, all identified possible hazards within the system merit risk 




5. SYSTEM-LEVEL TESTING 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
Complex systems must undergo a multitude of tests in order to be certified ready 
for flight.  Testing begins at the component level; with each component undergoing 
extensive evaluations to ensure that the expected performance characteristics are 
achieved.  At the same time, small conceptual tests are performed at the subsystem level 
to explore the pertinent theory utilized by the system.  However, the system cannot be 
certified as ready without full system-level testing that confirms the expected 
performance.  Such testing must be conducted in a manner as close as possible to the 
conditions in which the system will normally operate so as to identify performance 
deviations and to verify system function. 
5.2.  SYSTEM-LEVEL TEST GOALS 
The MR SAT propulsion system embodies an innovative approach to small 
satellite propulsion, and as such the theoretical work performed for the design process 
must be confirmed.  The key performance parameters still in need of physical 
demonstration for the refrigerant based system include the performance of the integrated 
PMD, the ability of the system to maintain the necessary tank temperature, and the 
overall thruster performance of the system.  These three physical traits of the system are 
interconnected in such a manner that they must be explored in unison for useful 
information to be determined.  The goal then, for system-level testing, is to develop a 




5.3.  REDUCED GRAVITY STUDENT FLIGHT OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM 
Under normal laboratory conditions it is difficult and perhaps impossible to 
accurately determine the successful operation of the integrated PMD since slosh effects 
occur only in micro gravity conditions.  Therefore, it was necessary to secure laboratory 
facilities that could mimic the micro gravity environment in which the propulsion system 
would normally operate.  
The Reduced Gravity Student Flight Opportunity Program (RGSFOP) is a NASA 
program in which university-presented research projects can secure flight time on NASA 
aircraft used to simulate micro gravity conditions.  The program begins in late September 
or early October with the submission of a research proposal by university group or design 
team seeking a flight berth.  In December, approximately 40 university teams are selected 
for flights during the first half of the following year. 
The C-9 aircraft used for the program flies a series of parabolas between 20,000 
and 35,000 feet.  As the aircraft flies over the crest of the flight pattern, approximately 30 
seconds of micro gravity occur during which experiments can be run.  As the aircraft 
pulls out of the dive, a period of twice normal gravity is experienced.  Each experiment 
receives two flights per flight week with approximately 30 parabolas of micro gravity 
encountered per flight. 
5.4. TEST APPARATUS 
With regard to the design of the testing apparatus, the intent was to develop a 
platform capable of supporting and conducting the proposed RGSFOP experiment and 




designed as a freestanding workstation incorporating the safety and measuring equipment 
necessary to perform the testing operations within the various experiment environments.   
5.4.1. Measuring Equipment.  The propulsion system developed for the satellite 
inherently incorporates two pressure transducers in order to monitor the tank pressure and 
regulated pressure of the system during spaceflight.  In order to augment the information 
gathering capabilities, two thermal-couples were added to the propulsion system: one 
placed directly at the tank outlet and one within the propellant lines just prior to the 
thruster.  Rounding out the measuring equipment is a single force transducer capable of 
measuring forces from 0 to 50 millinewtons positioned on the air bearing slide to directly 
measure thruster performance. 
5.4.2. Testing Platform Structural Design.  As the experiment was to be flown 
on board NASA’s “Weightless Wonder” aircraft, the experiment structure had to be 
constructed to the specifications outlined by the RGSFO program.  The experiment must 




Table 5.1: Experiment Loading Requirements 
Direction Loading Requirement 
Forward 9 g 
Aft 3 g 
Upward 2 g 
Downward 6 g 








The structural design of the experiment was kept very simple.  A base cart was 
constructed out of 2 inch by 1/8th inch thick aluminum angle welded into a rectangular 
frame.  Aluminum plate 1/8th inch thick was then welded to the frame to form the top and 
bottom shelf and work area.  While in Houston, significant concerns were discovered 
with the quality of the structural welds.  Therefore, to add greater strength to the 
structure, triangular gussets were bolted to the corners of the base cart.   
To contain the expelled propellant and prevent any leaks into the aircraft cabin, a 
containment box was developed.  The upper frame of the box was constructed from 1 
inch aluminum angle with 1 inch square tubing used as cross bracing.  The bottom rim of 
the containment box was fabricated from 2 inch aluminum angle and fitted with 12 bolts 
to allow for the attachment of the containment box to the base cart.  The sides and top of 
the containment box were enclosed using 3/8 inch thick Lexan bolted to the upper frame 
and sealed with silicone.  With this configuration, the propulsion system is bolted directly 
to the base cart with the containment box fitting over the top of it.  Testing Apparatus 
shows a diagram of the experimental set-up. 
5.4.3. Experiment Electronics Design.  Controlling the experiment and 
monitoring the various sensing devices required the development of a computer interface 
for the experiment.  The interface between the control/monitoring equipment and the 
computer was handled by means of a Data Acquisition (DAQ) board.  The DAQ board 
allowed the computer, using a custom designed LabVIEW program, to operate the two 
solenoid valves as well as the two resistive heaters within the system.  Utilizing the same 
program and DAQ system, the computer is also able to monitor and record the data from 




The power for the system is isolated from the aircraft by means of a Universal 
Power Supply (UPS).  The isolation is necessary to prevent aircraft power fluctuations 
from interfering with the experiment or computer operations.  The UPS battery will 
charge off aircraft power and in turn power the computer and experiment.  Small power 
supplies housed in the same box as the DAQ board provide the various voltages 
necessary for experiment operation.  A diagram of the testing platform can be found in 
Figure 5.1. 
5.5. TEST DESCRIPTION 
Accomplishing the testing goals set forth in Section 5.2 required a testing 
platform and experiment design capable of monitoring all aspects of system performance.  
Toward that end, a two-phase testing plan was developed that utilized a slightly modified 
propulsion system in both ground and microgravity environments. 
The modifications to the propulsion system were implemented both to expand the 
information gathering capabilities of the experiment and simplify the overall testing 
procedures.  In addition to the two thermal couples discussed above, other modifications 
include the removal of one isolation valve and the use of a single thruster as opposed to 
the full complement of eight.  Also, a length of flexible tubing was inserted into system to 







Figure 5.1: Testing Apparatus 
 
 
The basic goal of the ground-based testing is to assess the thermodynamic 
properties of the system as well as provide a base-reading of system performance to 
compare to later testing data.  For this test, a single thruster is fitted into an aluminum 




system is pressurized with R-134a propellant to the level equivalent which would used on 
orbit for the satellite.  The thruster will be fired in a variety of patterns to simulate 
situations which could occur on orbit.  This testing will determine the validity of the 
theoretical analysis performed on the system as well as allow for the optimal running 
conditions and equipment settings for the system to be determined.  Of particular interest 
is the recovery time necessary for the heater to overcome the temperature drop associated 
with the release of propellant.  The target temperature for the heating system and the 
pattern of heater use can be varied to determine the best settings for use. 
The flight testing is an extension of ground testing merely changing the apparent 
gravity on the system.  The flight will be used to verify the functionality of the PMD 
device within the tank and thus complete the final goal of system level testing.  The 
testing procedure utilized during flight will be exactly the same as on the ground to 
provide an equivalent comparison for performance.  Flight data will be compared to 
ground data to determine whether or not a detrimental effect on system performance is 
present during the microgravity testing.  Such a detrimental effect would indicate the 
failure of the internal PMD. 
5.6. TEST RESULTS  
Unfortunately, the test conducted in June of 2008 failed to produce results due to 
equipment failure.  Prior to the microgravity flights, a design flaw within the DAQ box 
caused a continuous 24 volts of electricity to be delivered to both the isolation valve and 
the thruster valve.  Consequently, both solenoids failed within the isolation valve and 




could not be ascertained; therefore, all electronics within the system were suspect and 
could not be used within the experiment.   
Given the situation, the experiment was quickly reworked to test the functionality 
of the experiment platform itself; specifically the air bearing system.   Testing on the 
aircraft confirmed that the air bearing system did not noticeably reduce friction along the 
slide.  Therefore, it is unlikely that useful force data would have been obtained even 
without the electrical failure.  Possible suggested causes for the inadequate performance 
of the air bearing include material galling and insufficient manufacturing methods.  
Galling is a form of surface damage that can occur when two like metals contact in a 
sliding manner.  Such surface damage increases friction and can prevent smooth sliding.  
While both the slide and guide tubing were made of aluminum 6061, and thus susceptible 
to galling, the nitrogen expelled by the air bearing should have prevented material contact 
and thus surface damage.   The more likely cause stems from the design and manufacture 
of the air bearing itself.  For an air bearing to be effective, the gas flow along the length 
of the track must be constant and even over the entire length.  Such was not the case with 
the MIS air bearing due to an uneven distribution of the holes and their diameter.  The 
uneven gas flow prevented the slide from moving freely along the guide tubing and thus 
prevent accurate force data from being collected.   
5.7. FUTURE TEST REQUIREMENTS 
The testing platform developed for the RGSFOP experiment is the foundation on 




first be made to the design in order to improve functionality.  Specifically, the problems 
with the air bearing system need to be addressed.   
Air bearings are precision devices; dependant on a multitude of design details 
such as hole pattern, slide weight, gas pressure, hole size, etc. to garner the expected 
performance. While an in-house design is certainly still an option, given the complex 
nature of such a design and the difficulties inherent in manufacturing to the necessary 
tolerances, a better use of time and team resources might be to procure a commercial air 
bearing system. Alternatively, research into other methods of friction reduction, such as a 
magnetic track system, or methods of force measuring which do not rely on the thruster 
moving could be conducted in order to address the issue and implement a functional 
device. 
With the minor modifications discussed above, the initial experiment can be run 
on future RGSFOP flights.  Afterword, the experiment can be modified and the testing 
platform updated to control and monitor multiple thrusters in order to determine the 
change in system performance as multiple thrusters are fired.  The effect of different 
propellant line configurations on thruster performance and different firing patterns can 





6.1.  SUMMARY 
As the M-SAT team transitions from the NS4 competition into NS6 and beyond, 
it is more important than ever to document not only the intricacies of design associated 
with the current system, but also the design and thought processes that directly and 
indirectly led to the final propulsion system.  The research described in this thesis 
expands upon prior works while focusing on the design process used to develop the M-
SAT propulsion system.  The design process described flowed from the mission 
requirements and program restrictions down through component-level requirements and 
resulted in a system capable of performing the assigned duties.  While future systems 
may face vastly different design and mission requirements, the example set forth by the 
NS4 system and the design process used can serve as a starting point for such endeavors. 
The hazard analysis conducted for this paper also expanded on previous analyses 
to address key issues and AFRL concerns.  The analysis showed the system to be safe for 
personnel and equipment as designed.  Since the design may change and future systems 
will be developed, the methodology behind the analysis was also included to serve as a 
reference for future hazard analyses.   
Finally, a propulsion test platform was developed to address the few remaining 
physical and theoretical performance questions remaining.  While the platform has yet to 
produce the necessary results, minor modifications are being implemented to ensure that 
the testing platform is operational and producing results in the near future.  The research 




performance.  Additional testing will focus on the thermodynamic aspect of the system to 
determine how thruster firing affects the system properties and at what frequency the 
thrusters can be cycled while maintaining heater effectiveness.  Testing can then be 
expanded to include multiple thrusters in order to determine the effect such situations 
have on overall system performance.   
6.2. FUTURE WORK 
While the propulsion design for the NS4 Satellite met the mission requirements, it 
was a first-generation design with much room for further improvement.  Design 
compromises due to time and other constraints plus overall inexperience with satellite 
propulsion design has left several areas within the design where modifications could 
potentially improve performance.   
The first major design change which could significantly improve mission 
performance involves attaining control along the final translational axis.  As discussed 
previously, a design constraint on thruster placement within the satellite was the desire to 
minimize the complexity and cost of the design by minimizing the number of thrusters 
used.  However, the additional control axis would allow the satellite to avoid the 
necessity of the ninety degree attitude rotation at the onset of formation flight and thus 
preserve propellant and extend the formation flight duration.  Therefore, a new thruster 
configuration that offers control of all translational and rotational axes should be 
researched and implemented.  A traditional 12 thruster pattern could be implemented 




SAT and the docking interface of MRS SAT on top and limits propellant contamination 
along the solar panels.   
Another area of possible modification, particularly considering the likely changes 
in MR SAT structure and configuration due to NS6 requirements, is the running and 
division of propellant lines within the satellite.  Currently, the main line is divided into 
the various sub-lines by means of standard fittings; however, it has been suggested that a 
manifold design could simplify the running of propellant lines and reduce the number of 
connection points within the system.  This last point is particularly important given that 
leaks are a common cause of losses within cold gas propulsion systems.  Integration 
could also be simplified as fittings would no longer need to be attached to the side panels 
for support and propellant lines could be routed directly to the thruster.  A trade study 
should be conducted utilizing both theoretical and experimental loss data as well as 
integration considerations to determine the possible benefits associated with such a 
design change. 
These modifications should improve propulsion system performance and allow 
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Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the 
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.
Maintaining the factors of safety within the propellant tank requires that the specified propellant 
mass be added to the tank.  Filling procedures have been developed that incorporate mass 
measuring equipment to ensure the correct propellant mass is added.  These procedures will be 
implemented each time the propellant tank is charged with propellant.  Each step of the filling 
procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician to 
ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be reported to the 
appropriate authorities.





Propellant tank rupture is caused by the structural failure of the tank.  The most likely reason for 
such an occurrence is the propellant pressure exceeding the yield point of the tank material.  
The rupture of the propellant tank would be an extremely dangerous situation.  It involves the 
spontaneous and sudden release all propellant stored within the propellant tank.  The force of such 
a release could severely damage nearby equipment (including satellite and launch vehicle 
equipment) and cause injury or death to personnel.
The probability of propellant tank rupture within the MR SAT propulsion system is considered 
remote.  This is mainly due to the limited propellant mass which is to be stored within the tank.  At 
the 100 psi equivalent point, a FOS greater than 14 is achieved with regard to the theoretical Burst 
Pressure (1421 psi) for the Marrotta tank and a FOS greater than 2 exists with regard to proof 
pressure (235 psi).  At the maximum operational pressure being considered (307 psi) a FOS of 
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Propellant Tank Leak Tk01
Maintaining the factors of safety within the propellant tank requires that the specified propellant 
mass be added to the tank.  Filling procedures have been developed that incorporate mass 
measuring equipment to ensure the correct propellant mass is added.  These procedures will be 
implemented each time the propellant tank is charged with propellant.  Each step of the filling 
procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician to 




A leak from the propellant tank could be caused by two possible failures.  The first failure involves 
the yielding of the tank material in a manner that allows propellant to slowly be expelled from the 
pressurized tank.  The second failure involves the inadequate tightening of the fittings on the inlet 
and outlet end of the tank.
A leak of the propellant from the tank during flight would immediately put the successful 
completion of mission objectives in jeopardy due to lack of sufficient propellant to complete 
maneuvers.  Additionally, leaked propellant could interact with nearby materials to the detriment of 
said materials.  Finally, should the leak occur during testing or loading, nearby personnel could be 
exposed to R-134a which can cause skin irritation, frost-bite, or asphyxiation in enclosed areas.
The first failure mode is considered unlikely due to the factory testing performed by Marrotta UK  
(leak test performed using He and proof tested to 16 bar) and due to the high factors of safety 
within the system.  The second failure mode is considered more likely to occur if sufficient assembly 
procedures and quality assurance policies are not implemented.  
Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the 
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Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed 
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly.  Each step 
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician 
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be reported to the 
appropriate authorities.
Hazard Analysis
For the material of the special elbow fitting to experience yield, the pressure seen by the fitting 
would have to greatly exceed the specified ranges for this mission.
Should the material of the special elbow fitting yield, at minimum the resulting propellant loss 
would put the successful completion of mission objectives in doubt.  Additionally, damage could 
occur to surrounding equipment and personnel should the release of propellant result in shrapnel or 
flying parts.
The Swagelok fittings are rated to even higher pressures than the propellant tank.  (~4000 psig) 
Therefore, the chance for material yield leading to leaks and propellant loss is remote.
Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the 
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.
prop-003 3
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Special Elbow Fitting Leak ESML01
Pre-mitigation Classification
Hazard Analysis
The most obvious cause for a loss of propellant stemming from the special elbow is the improper 
tightening at the connection points of the fitting.  
Leaks both small and large at this point of the system will have detrimental effects on the 
performance of system objectives.  Leaks stemming from such a cause would not have the explosive 
nature of a rupture and as such are less likely to cause damage.  However, leaking propellant could 
increase risk of asphyxiation and propellant reactions with nearby materials.  
When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account.  If procedures are not 
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous 
situations can occur.
Physical mitigation is not possible for this hazard.
The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer 
tightening procedures are followed.  Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a 
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point.  Each step of the 
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance 
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be 
reported to the appropriate authorities.  Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a 
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The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer 
tightening procedures are followed.  Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a 
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point.  Each step of the 
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance 
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be 
reported to the appropriate authorities.  Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a 
controlled manner to ensure any potential leak is addressed prior to launch.
Hazard Analysis
The most probable cause for a loss of propellant stemming from the first Swagelok Tee fitting is the 
improper tightening at the connection points of the fitting.  Additionally, the manufacturing of 
tubing connection also can have an effect on the connection point since for a proper seal to develop 
the tubing needs to have a smooth, flat end.
A leak at this point in the system, even a small one, could alter the reading of the attached pressure 
transducer and thus hamper the monitoring of propellant tank pressure.  Also, any loss of propellant 
reduces the chances of mission success.
When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account.  If procedures are not 
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous 
situations can occur.  
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The material yields due to excessive stress caused by over-pressurization
A leak at this point in the system, even a small one, could alter the reading of the attached pressure 
transducer and thus hamper the monitoring of propellant tank pressure.  Additionally, a rupture 
could damage surrounding equipment such as the pressure transducer and lead to further hazards.  
Finally, the loss of propellant would end the mission.
The Swagelok fittings are rated to even higher pressures than the propellant tank.  (~4000 psig) 
Therefore, the chance for material yield leading to leaks and propellant loss is remote.
Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the 
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.
Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed 
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly.  Each step 
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician 
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The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer 
tightening procedures are followed.  Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a 
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point.  Each step of the 
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance 
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be 
reported to the appropriate authorities.  Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a 
controlled manner to ensure any potential leak is addressed prior to launch.
Hazard Analysis
As with all fittings the most likely cause of a leak is an improper connection.
Leaks both small and large at this point of the system will have detrimental effects on the 
performance of system objectives.  Additionally, leaking propellant could increase risk of 
asphyxiation and propellant reactions with nearby materials.  
When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account.  If procedures are not 
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous 
situations can occur.
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The material yields due to excessive stress caused by over-pressurization
A leak at this point in the system, even a small one, could alter the reading of the attached pressure 
transducer and thus hamper the monitoring of propellant tank pressure.  Additionally, a rupture 
could damage surrounding equipment such as the pressure transducer and lead to further hazards.  
Finally, the loss of propellant would end the mission.
The Swagelok fittings are rated to even higher pressures than the propellant tank.  (~4000 psig) 
Therefore, the chance for material yield leading to leaks and propellant loss is remote.
Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the 
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.
Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed 
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly.  Each step 
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician 
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The assembly procedures for this connection are designed to minimize the force placed upon the 
tubing by isolating the tubing during the tightening process with the aid of a vice.  Each step of the 
procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician to 
ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be reported to the 
appropriate authorities.  
Hazard Analysis
The two sections of the coupling are connected by a very narrow (1/16" OD) tubing which can easily 
be bent if excessive stress is placed upon it during assembly (tightening of fittings)
A bending of the tubing could cause the tubing to crimp which would cut off the attached pressure 
transducer from the system.  Without the pressure transducer reading tank conditions could not be 
monitored which could increase the subsequent risk of hazards.  
The delicate nature of the connecting tubing means that it is very susceptible to being bent.  If too 
much stress is applied to the tubing during the assembly process the tubing will bend and possibly 
crimp.  
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PtML01 electrical failure PtML01
Pre-mitigation Classification
Hazard Analysis
The pressure transducers require specific voltages and power levels to maintain proper function.  
The electrical conditioning could be altered by flaws in the circuitry or problems with the connecting 
wires.
Should the electronics of the first pressure transducer fail, the tank pressure would remain 
unmonitored for the duration of the mission.  This could allow a potentially hazardous situation to 
go unnoticed and have detrimental effects on the mission.
The possibility of an electrical failure cannot be entirely discounted; however, such defects can be 
detected during testing in a safe manner.  Therefore, the probability of electrical failure causing a 
dangerous situation is considered remote.
The boards will be designed in such a way that the pressure transducers receive the power levels 
they need to accurately record the tank pressure.
In order to prevent a possible hazard, the electronics connected to the pressure transducers will be 
thoroughly tested prior to charging the tank.  Any and all defects or discrepancies will be recorded 
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4                  
(100 psi)
Currently, the system is only safe at the 100 psi level.  Therefore, proper filling procedures must be 
adhered to in order to ensure the safety of surrounding personnel and equipment.  Such filling 
procedures have been developed and will be implemented in a step by step manner.  Each step of 
the procedures will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance observer.  
Any deviations will be reported to the appropriate authorities.
Hazard Analysis
For the pressure transducer to burst, the material (stainless steel) of the outer casing would have to 
yield.  Over pressurization could trigger material yield.
A rupture of the first pressure transducer would release most of the stored propellant and therefore 
ruin any chance of mission success.  Also, such a release of energy could cause damage to nearby 
equipment and injuries to nearby personnel.  
The pressure transducers (both first and second) used for the MR SAT propulsion system are of a 
type rated to pressures up to 10000 psig.  However, due to the restrictions on tank pressure both 
transducers were calibrated for a maximum pressure of 200 psi to give better precision to the 
instrument.  It is unknown at this time if pressures greater than 200 psi would destroy the 
transducers and present a hazardous situation.  Therefore, the current probability rating is unknown 
for pressures greater than 200 psi.  For the 100 psi operating pressure the FOS of 2 makes the 
possibility of burst remote.
If tank pressure greater than 100 psi are to be used for the MR SAT propulsion system, a new 
pressure transducer may need to be procured to monitor tank pressure. 
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VML01 stuck closed VML01
Pre-mitigation Classification
Hazard Analysis
The most likely cause for an isolation valve being locked in the closed position is an electrical 
problem preventing the opening of the valve.  This could be the electrical board never sending the 
24 volt pulse required for opening, or physical damage to the internal solenoid of the valve.
With the first isolation valve stuck in the closed position, formation flight is unachievable.  However, 
there is not a potential risk of injury or further equipment damage associated with this failure mode.  
The design of the electrical boards which control the isolation valves are not under the control of 
the propulsion subsystem.  However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the 
system.  Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is 
currently rated as probable.
Change out non working valves.
Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary.  Such testing will begin with 
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and 
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration.  Any deviations from nominal operation will be 
recorded and reported to the proper authorities.  Electrical problems documented in the testing 
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Thorough testing of all valves will be conducted.  Any deviations from nominal operation will be 
recorded and reported to the proper authorities.  All valves failing to achieve nominal operation will 
be replace.
Hazard Analysis
The Lee Valve designed is a 'fail safe' design in that the valve is designed to close if power is not 
continually supplied to the solenoid.  Therefore, most likely cause of a valve stuck in the open 
position is a defective part.
With the valve stuck in the open position, the tank's isolation from the rest of the system is lost 
along with one of the three system inhibits.  This is not directly detrimental to mission objectives as 
the first isolation valve is to remain open throughout the period of formation flight anyway; 
however, the lack of isolation of the tank prior to the start of formation flight increases the 
probability of propellant loss due to connection leakage (as the propellant is exposed to more 
connections).
Due to the fail safe nature of the design, it is considered a remote possibility that the isolation valve 
will be stuck in the open position.
All defective valves discovered in the testing process will be replaced.
Prop-013 4
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The inner mechanisms of the isolation valves are extremely narrow and easily clogged with foreign 
material present within the propellant lines.  (Left over material from the construction process such 
as metallic shavings)
Foreign material lodged within the valve can interfere with the workings of the internal poppet and 
lock the valve in either the open or closed position.
Since all parts of the propulsion system are machined, the possibility of foreign debris lodged within 
the propellant lines can not be discounted.  Without mitigation a clog of the valve is likely to be a 
frequent occurrence.
Fine mesh filters added before each valve within the system will capture any debris before it can 
interfere with the internal workings of the valve.
Each part will be cleaned with isopropyl alcohol prior to incorporation within the system.  This 
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Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed 
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly.  Each step 
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician 
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be reported to the 
appropriate authorities.
Hazard Analysis
For the isolation valve to burst, it would have to experience a propellant pressure greater than its 
yield pressure.  Additionally, over heating of the valve could cause the outer casing of the valve to 
rupture.
A rupture of the first isolation valve would release most of the stored propellant and therefore ruin 
any chance of mission success.  Also, such a release of energy could cause damage to nearby 
equipment and injuries to nearby personnel.  
Valve rupture due to over pressurization is a remote possibility due to the high factors of safety 
associated with the valve.  The valve is rated to 1125 psi; therefore, at the 100 psi setting, the FOS is 
greater than 11.  For the 307 psi setting, the FOS is still a respectable 3.66.  Valve rupture due to 
over heating is also considered a remote possibility based upon the expected temperature range for 
the mission.  The valve is rated to 70 C and has been observed during functional  testing by MAS to 
function properly at temperatures greater than 100 C.                       
Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the 
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The most likely cause of a noticeable leak stemming from the first isolation valve is improper 
tightening of the Swagelok connections.
A leak from the first isolation valve would cause a serious loss of propellant and could be 
detrimental to mission goals.
When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account.  If procedures are not 
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous 
situations can occur.
No physical mitigation is possible for this hazard.
The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer 
tightening procedures are followed.  Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a 
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point.  Each step of the 
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance 
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be 
reported to the appropriate authorities.  Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a 
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Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary.  Such testing will begin with 
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and 
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration.  Any deviations from nominal operation will be 
recorded and reported to the proper authorities.  Electrical problems documented in the testing 
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.
Hazard Analysis
The voltage step-down is accomplished by the propulsion electronics board.  The most obvious 
cause of the failure of voltage step-down for the isolation valve would be the failure of the 
electronics board either due to component malfunction or improper design.
The Lee valves used for the MR SAT propulsion system rely on a 24 V pulse to open.  The voltage is 
then stepped down to 5 volts to maintain the open state.  If the step-down process does not occur 
within the time specified, the excess voltage could destroy the solenoid and cause the valve to over 
heat and possibly rupture.  
The design of the electrical boards which control the isolation valves are not under the control of 
the propulsion subsystem.  However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the 
system.  Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is 
currently rated as probable.
A properly designed electronics board controlling the system could reduce the probability to 
remote.
Prop-017 4
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The rupture of the pressure regulator would be caused by an over pressurization of the system 
which results in material yield.
Should the material of the pressure regulator yield, at minimum the resulting propellant loss would 
put the successful completion of mission objectives in doubt.  Additionally, damage could occur to 
surrounding equipment and personnel should the release of propellant result in shrapnel or flying 
parts.
The inlet portion of the pressure regulator is rated to 1000 psi.  Therefore at the 100 psi equivalent 
mark a FOS of 10 exists.  At the maximum pressure being considered for the system (307 psi) a FOS 
of 3.25 is maintained.  Therefore, material yield is considered a remote possibility.
Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the 
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.
Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed 
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly.  Each step 
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician 
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The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer 
tightening procedures are followed.  Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a 
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point.  Each step of the 
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance 
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be 
reported to the appropriate authorities.  Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a 
controlled manner to ensure any potential leak is addressed prior to launch.
Hazard Analysis
The most likely cause of a noticeable leak stemming from the pressure regulator is improper 
tightening of the Swagelok connections.
Assuming the first isolation valve remains closed (and holds seal) until the beginning of formation 
flight, a small leak at this point of the system would not prevent the implementation of formation 
flight, but could drastically reduce the duration which formation flight can be held.  A major leak 
would prevent formation flight being maintained for any meaningful duration.  
When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account.  If procedures are not 
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous 
situations can occur.
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RML01 Failure to Regulate Pressure RML01
Pre-mitigation Classification
Hazard Analysis
The pressure regulator is preset at the factory to a specific outlet pressure.  For the regulator to fail 
to reduce outlet pressure, the internal mechanism of the regulator would have to fail.
With out the benefit of pressure regulation, the remainder of the system would be exposed to the 
pressure remaining in the tank.  The exposure would not likely result in problems as all system 
components are rated to withstand the full system pressure.  However, the loss of regulation could 
have a detrimental effect on system performance as the thrust produced by the nozzles would 
continually be changing as the tank pressure is reduced.  
The possibility of a factory defect is considered remote.  
No physical mitigation is possible in this case.
Thorough testing of the pressure regulator will be conducted.  Any deviations from nominal 
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The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer 
tightening procedures are followed.  Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a 
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point.  Each step of the 
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance 
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be 
reported to the appropriate authorities.  Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a 
controlled manner to ensure any potential leak is addressed prior to launch.
Hazard Analysis
The most probable cause for a loss of propellant stemming from the second Swagelok Tee fitting is 
the improper tightening at the connection points of the fitting.  Additionally, the manufacturing of 
tubing connection also can have an effect on the connection point since for a proper seal to develop 
the tubing needs to have a smooth, flat end.
With the tee placed after the first isolation valve, a leak stemming from it will not cause major 
propellant loss before the beginning of formation flight (assuming the valve seal is maintained).  
However, any loss of propellant reduces the possible duration of the formation flight phase, and the 
pressure loss associated with the leak would disrupt the readings of the second pressure transducer 
and affect the monitoring of the regulated pressure.
When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account.  If procedures are not 
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous 
situations can occur.  
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The material yields due to excessive stress caused by over-pressurization
A rupture could damage surrounding equipment such as the pressure transducer and lead to further 
hazards.  Additionally, the loss of propellant would end the mission.
The fitting in question is after the pressure regulation device within the system.  Therefore, it should 
experience at most 24.7 psi of pressure which is well within the capabilities of the fitting.  Even if 
the regulator should fail, the Swagelok fittings are rated to even higher pressures than the 
propellant tank.  (~4000 psig) Therefore, the chance for material yield leading to leaks and 
propellant loss is remote.
Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the 
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.
Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed 
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly.  Each step 
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician 
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The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer 
tightening procedures are followed.  Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a 
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point.  Each step of the 
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance 
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be 
reported to the appropriate authorities.  Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a 
controlled manner to ensure any potential leak is addressed prior to launch.
Hazard Analysis
The most likely cause of a leak regarding a Swagelok fitting is an improper connection point.  This 
could be cause by either improper tightening or improper tubing construction.
Given that the fitting in question is after the first isolation valve, propellant loss stemming from a 
leak at this point of the system would not occur until formation flight had been engaged.  However, 
a leak would limit the ability of the second pressure transducer to monitor regulated pressure and 
would reduce the time available for formation flight.
When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account.  If procedures are not 
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous 
situations can occur.
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The material yields due to excessive stress caused by over-pressurization
A rupture could damage surrounding equipment such as the pressure transducer and lead to further 
hazards.  Additionally, the loss of propellant would end the mission.
The fitting in question is after the pressure regulation device within the system.  Therefore, it should 
experience at most 24.7 psi of pressure which is well within the capabilities of the fitting.  Even if 
the regulator should fail, the Swagelok fittings are rated to even higher pressures than the 
propellant tank.  (~4000 psig) Therefore, the chance for material yield leading to leaks and 
propellant loss is remote.
Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the 
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.
Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed 
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly.  Each step 
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician 
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The assembly procedures for this connection are designed to minimize the force placed upon the 
tubing by isolating the tubing during the tightening process with the aid of a vice.  Each step of the 
procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician to 
ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be reported to the 
appropriate authorities.  
Hazard Analysis
The two sections of the coupling are connected by a very narrow (1/16" OD) tubing which can easily 
be bent if excessive stress is placed upon it during assembly (tightening of fittings)
A bending of the tubing could cause the tubing to crimp which would cut off the attached pressure 
transducer from the system.  Without the pressure transducer reading tank conditions could not be 
monitored which could increase the subsequent risk of hazards.  
The delicate nature of the connecting tubing means that it is very susceptible to being bent.  If too 
much stress is applied to the tubing during the assembly process the tubing will bend and possibly 
crimp.  
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PtML02 electrical failure PtML02
Pre-mitigation Classification
Hazard Analysis
The pressure transducers require specific voltages and power levels to maintain proper function.  
The electrical conditioning could be altered by flaws in the circuitry or problems with the connecting 
wires.
Should the electronics of the second pressure transducer fail, the regulated pressure would remain 
unmonitored for the duration of the mission.  This could allow a potentially hazardous situation to 
go unnoticed and have detrimental effects on the mission.
The possibility of an electrical failure cannot be entirely discounted; however, such defects can be 
detected during testing in a safe manner.  Therefore, the probability of electrical failure causing a 
dangerous situation is considered remote.
The boards will be designed in such a way that the pressure transducers receive the power levels 
they need to accurately record the tank pressure.
In order to prevent a possible hazard, the electronics connected to the pressure transducers will be 
thoroughly tested prior to charging the tank.  Any and all defects or discrepancies will be recorded 
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The safety of this device depends on the operation of the pressure regulation device.  Therefore, 
system testing is imperative.  Any and all deviations with system components will be reported to the 
proper authorities.  
Hazard Analysis
For the pressure transducer to burst, the material (stainless steel) of the outer casing would have to 
yield.  Over pressurization could trigger material yield.
A rupture of the first pressure transducer would release most of the stored propellant and therefore 
ruin any chance of mission success.  Also, such a release of energy could cause damage to nearby 
equipment and injuries to nearby personnel.  
The pressure transducers (both first and second) used for the MR SAT propulsion system are of a 
type rated to pressures up to 10000 psig.  However, due to the restrictions on tank pressure both 
transducers were calibrated for a maximum pressure of 200 psi to give better precision to the 
instrument.  As this pressure transducer is after the regulator, it should experience only relatively 
low pressures; therefore, the possibility of rupture is considered remote.
To entirely prevent this hazard from occurring, a new pressure transducer rated to a pressure 
greater than the tank pressure is required.  However, as currently designed the probability of hazard 
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Change out non working valves.
Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary.  Such testing will begin with 
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and 
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration.  Any deviations from nominal operation will be 
recorded and reported to the proper authorities.  Electrical problems documented in the testing 
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.
Prop-028 4
VML02 stuck closed VML02
Pre-mitigation Classification
Hazard Analysis
The most likely cause for an isolation valve being locked in the closed position is an electrical 
problem preventing the opening of the valve.  This could be the electrical board never sending the 
24 volt pulse required for opening, or physical damage to the internal solenoid of the valve.
With the second isolation valve stuck in the closed position, formation flight is unachievable.  
However, there is not a potential risk of injury or further equipment damage associated with this 
failure mode.  
The design of the electrical boards which control the isolation valves are not under the control of 
the propulsion subsystem.  However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the 
system.  Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is 
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Thorough testing of all valves will be conducted.  Any deviations from nominal operation will be 
recorded and reported to the proper authorities.  All valves failing to achieve nominal operation will 
be replace.
Hazard Analysis
The Lee Valve designed is a 'fail safe' design in that the valve is designed to close if power is not 
continually supplied to the solenoid.  Therefore, most likely cause of a valve stuck in the open 
position is a defective part.
With the valve stuck in the open position, the second of the three system inhibits is lost.  This is not 
directly detrimental to mission objectives as the first isolation valve maintains tank isolation, and the 
second isolation valve is to remain open throughout the period of formation flight anyway.
Due to the fail safe nature of the design, it is considered a remote possibility that the isolation valve 
will be stuck in the open position.
All defective valves discovered in the testing process will be replaced.
Prop-029 4
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The inner mechanisms of the isolation valves are extremely narrow and easily clogged with foreign 
material present within the propellant lines.  (Left over material from the construction process such 
as metallic shavings)
Foreign material lodged within the valve can interfere with the workings of the internal poppet and 
lock the valve in either the open or closed position.
Since all parts of the propulsion system are machined, the possibility of foreign debris lodged within 
the propellant lines can not be discounted.  Without mitigation a clog of the valve is likely to be a 
frequent occurrence.
Fine mesh filters added before each valve within the system will capture any debris before it can 
interfere with the internal workings of the valve.
Each part will be cleaned with isopropyl alcohol prior to incorporation within the system.  This 
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Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed 
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly.  Each step 
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician 
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be reported to the 
appropriate authorities.
Hazard Analysis
For the isolation valve to burst, it would have to experience a propellant pressure greater than its 
yield pressure.  Additionally, over heating of the valve could cause the outer casing of the valve to 
rupture.
A rupture of the second isolation valve would prevent propellant from reaching the thruster 
assemblies, and thus end the formation flight portion of the mission.  Also, such a release of energy 
could cause damage to nearby equipment and injuries to nearby personnel.  
Valve rupture due to over pressurization is a remote possibility due to the high factors of safety 
associated with the valve.  The valve is rated to 1125 psi; therefore even discounting the presence of 
the pressure regulator, at the 100 psi setting, the FOS is greater than 11.  For the 307 psi setting, the 
FOS is still a respectable 3.66.  Valve rupture due to over heating is also considered a remote 
possibility based upon the expected temperature range for the mission.  The valve is rated to 70 C 
and has been observed during functional  testing by MAS to function properly at temperatures 
greater than 100 C.                       
Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the 
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The most likely cause of a noticeable leak stemming from the second isolation valve is improper 
tightening of the Swagelok connections.
A leak in the second isolation valve would not immediately cause a loss of propellant (assuming the 
first isolation valve is functioning properly).  However, once formation flight operations begin, the 
leaking propellant would limit the duration of the formation flight mission phase.    
When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account.  If procedures are not 
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous 
situations can occur.
No physical mitigation is possible for this hazard.
The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer 
tightening procedures are followed.  Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a 
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point.  Each step of the 
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance 
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be 
reported to the appropriate authorities.  Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a 
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Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary.  Such testing will begin with 
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and 
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration.  Any deviations from nominal operation will be 
recorded and reported to the proper authorities.  Electrical problems documented in the testing 
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.
Hazard Analysis
The voltage step-down is accomplished by the propulsion electronics board.  The most obvious 
cause of the failure of voltage step-down for the isolation valve would be the failure of the 
electronics board either due to component malfunction or improper design.
The Lee valves used for the MR SAT propulsion system rely on a 24 V pulse to open.  The voltage is 
then stepped down to 5 volts to maintain the open state.  If the step-down process does not occur 
within the time specified, the excess voltage could destroy the solenoid and cause the valve to over 
heat and possibly rupture.  
The design of the electrical boards which control the isolation valves are not under the control of 
the propulsion subsystem.  However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the 
system.  Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is 
currently rated as probable.
A properly designed electronics board controlling the system could reduce the probability to 
remote.
Prop-033 4
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Swagelok Cross (CML01) Leak CML01
Pre-mitigation Classification
Hazard Analysis
The most likely cause of a leak regarding a Swagelok fitting is an improper connection point.  This 
could be cause by either improper tightening or improper tubing construction.
A leak stemming from the Swagelok cross would cause a loss of propellant during the formation 
flight phase of the mission.  Thus that phase of the mission would be reduced in time and mission 
goals may not be met.  There is little to no danger to personnel as the two isolation valves should 
prevent propellant from reaching the cross fitting except during controlled testing of the system.  
When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account.  If procedures are not 
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous 
situations can occur.
No physical mitigation is possible for this hazard.
The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer 
tightening procedures are followed.  Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a 
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point.  Each step of the 
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance 
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be 
reported to the appropriate authorities.  Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a 





Hazard Number Final RAC



















A rupture at this point within the system would immediately end the formation flight portion of the 
mission and seriously jeopardize extended mission operations.  A rupture could also cause damage 
to other near by satellite equipment; thus, further reducing the chances of mission success.
The fitting in question is after the pressure regulation device within the system.  Therefore, it should 
experience at most 24.7 psi of pressure which is well within the capabilities of the fitting.  Even if 
the regulator should fail, the Swagelok fittings are rated to even higher pressures than the 
propellant tank.  (~4000 psig) Therefore, the chance for material yield leading to leaks and 
propellant loss is remote.
Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the 
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.
Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed 
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly.  Each step 
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician 
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be reported to the 
appropriate authorities.
Prop-035 3
Swagelok Cross (CML01) Rupture CML01
Pre-mitigation Classification
Hazard Analysis
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The most likely cause of a leak regarding a Swagelok fitting is an improper connection point.  This 
could be cause by either improper tightening or improper tubing construction.
A leak stemming from the Swagelok tee TL101 would cause a loss of propellant during the formation 
flight phase of the mission.  Thus that phase of the mission would be reduced in time and mission 
goals may not be met.  There is little to no danger to personnel as the two isolation valves should 
prevent propellant from reaching the fitting except during controlled testing of the system.  
When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account.  If procedures are not 
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous 
situations can occur.
No physical mitigation is possible for this hazard.
The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer 
tightening procedures are followed.  Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a 
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point.  Each step of the 
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance 
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be 
reported to the appropriate authorities.  Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a 
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The material yields due to excessive stress caused by over-pressurization
A rupture at this point within the system would immediately end the formation flight portion of the 
mission and seriously jeopardize extended mission operations.  A rupture could also cause damage 
to other near by satellite equipment; thus, further reducing the chances of mission success.
The fitting in question is after the pressure regulation device within the system.  Therefore, it should 
experience at most 24.7 psi of pressure which is well within the capabilities of the fitting.  Even if 
the regulator should fail, the Swagelok fittings are rated to even higher pressures than the 
propellant tank.  (~4000 psig) Therefore, the chance for material yield leading to leaks and 
propellant loss is remote.
Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the 
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.
Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed 
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly.  Each step 
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician 
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The most likely cause of a leak regarding a Swagelok fitting is an improper connection point.  This 
could be cause by either improper tightening or improper tubing construction.
A leak stemming from the Swagelok tee TL201 would cause a loss of propellant during the formation 
flight phase of the mission.  Thus that phase of the mission would be reduced in time and mission 
goals may not be met.  There is little to no danger to personnel as the two isolation valves should 
prevent propellant from reaching the fitting except during controlled testing of the system.  
When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account.  If procedures are not 
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous 
situations can occur.
No physical mitigation is possible for this hazard.
The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer 
tightening procedures are followed.  Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a 
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point.  Each step of the 
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance 
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be 
reported to the appropriate authorities.  Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a 
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The material yields due to excessive stress caused by over-pressurization
A rupture at this point within the system would immediately end the formation flight portion of the 
mission and seriously jeopardize extended mission operations.  A rupture could also cause damage 
to other near by satellite equipment; thus, further reducing the chances of mission success.
The fitting in question is after the pressure regulation device within the system.  Therefore, it should 
experience at most 24.7 psi of pressure which is well within the capabilities of the fitting.  Even if 
the regulator should fail, the Swagelok fittings are rated to even higher pressures than the 
propellant tank.  (~4000 psig) Therefore, the chance for material yield leading to leaks and 
propellant loss is remote.
Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the 
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.
Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed 
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly.  Each step 
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician 
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A leak stemming from the Swagelok tee TL301 would cause a loss of propellant during the formation 
flight phase of the mission.  Thus that phase of the mission would be reduced in time and mission 
goals may not be met.  There is little to no danger to personnel as the two isolation valves should 
prevent propellant from reaching the fitting except during controlled testing of the system.  
The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer 
tightening procedures are followed.  Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a 
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point.  Each step of the 
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance 
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be 
reported to the appropriate authorities.  Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a 
controlled manner to ensure any potential leak is addressed prior to launch.
TL301 leak TL301
Hazard Analysis
The most likely cause of a leak regarding a Swagelok fitting is an improper connection point.  This 
could be cause by either improper tightening or improper tubing construction.
When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account.  If procedures are not 
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous 
situations can occur.
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A rupture at this point within the system would immediately end the formation flight portion of the 
mission and seriously jeopardize extended mission operations.  A rupture could also cause damage 
to other near by satellite equipment; thus, further reducing the chances of mission success.
Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed 
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly.  Each step 
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician 




The material yields due to excessive stress caused by over-pressurization
The fitting in question is after the pressure regulation device within the system.  Therefore, it should 
experience at most 24.7 psi of pressure which is well within the capabilities of the fitting.  Even if 
the regulator should fail, the Swagelok fittings are rated to even higher pressures than the 
propellant tank.  (~4000 psig) Therefore, the chance for material yield leading to leaks and 
propellant loss is remote.
Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the 
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A leak stemming from the Swagelok tee TL2a01 would cause a loss of propellant during the 
formation flight phase of the mission.  Thus that phase of the mission would be reduced in time and 
mission goals may not be met.  There is little to no danger to personnel as the two isolation valves 
should prevent propellant from reaching the fitting except during controlled testing of the system.  
The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer 
tightening procedures are followed.  Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a 
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point.  Each step of the 
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance 
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be 
reported to the appropriate authorities.  Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a 
controlled manner to ensure any potential leak is addressed prior to launch.
TL2a01 leak TL2a01
Hazard Analysis
The most likely cause of a leak regarding a Swagelok fitting is an improper connection point.  This 
could be cause by either improper tightening or improper tubing construction.
When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account.  If procedures are not 
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous 
situations can occur.
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A rupture at this point within the system would immediately end the formation flight portion of the 
mission and seriously jeopardize extended mission operations.  A rupture could also cause damage 
to other near by satellite equipment; thus, further reducing the chances of mission success.
Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed 
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly.  Each step 
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician 





The material yields due to excessive stress caused by over-pressurization
The fitting in question is after the pressure regulation device within the system.  Therefore, it should 
experience at most 24.7 psi of pressure which is well within the capabilities of the fitting.  Even if 
the regulator should fail, the Swagelok fittings are rated to even higher pressures than the 
propellant tank.  (~4000 psig) Therefore, the chance for material yield leading to leaks and 
propellant loss is remote.
Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the 
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The most likely cause of a leak regarding a Swagelok fitting is an improper connection point.  This 
could be cause by either improper tightening or improper tubing construction.
The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer 
tightening procedures are followed.  Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a 
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point.  Each step of the 
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance 
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be 
reported to the appropriate authorities.  Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a 
controlled manner to ensure any potential leak is addressed prior to launch.
A leak stemming from the Swagelok tee TL2b01 would cause a loss of propellant during the 
formation flight phase of the mission.  Thus that phase of the mission would be reduced in time and 
mission goals may not be met.  There is little to no danger to personnel as the two isolation valves 
should prevent propellant from reaching the fitting except during controlled testing of the system.  
When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account.  If procedures are not 
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous 
situations can occur.
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The material yields due to excessive stress caused by over-pressurization
Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed 
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly.  Each step 
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician 
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be reported to the 
appropriate authorities.
A rupture at this point within the system would immediately end the formation flight portion of the 
mission and seriously jeopardize extended mission operations.  A rupture could also cause damage 
to other near by satellite equipment; thus, further reducing the chances of mission success.
The fitting in question is after the pressure regulation device within the system.  Therefore, it should 
experience at most 24.7 psi of pressure which is well within the capabilities of the fitting.  Even if 
the regulator should fail, the Swagelok fittings are rated to even higher pressures than the 
propellant tank.  (~4000 psig) Therefore, the chance for material yield leading to leaks and 
propellant loss is remote.
Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the 
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Change out non working valves.
Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary.  Such testing will begin with 
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and 
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration.  Any deviations from nominal operation will be 
recorded and reported to the proper authorities.  Electrical problems documented in the testing 
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.
Prop-046 4
Tr05 stuck closed Tr05 (TrL1a01)
Pre-mitigation Classification
Hazard Analysis
The most likely cause for a thruster valve being locked in the closed position is an electrical problem 
preventing the opening of the valve.  This could be the electrical board never sending the 24 volt 
pulse required for opening, or physical damage to the internal solenoid of the valve.
Thruster Tr05 is responsible for providing counterclockwise rotation around the x axis of the satellite 
(assuming positive x axis runs through panel 4).  With this thruster stuck in the closed position, 
rotation maneuvers around the x axis would be limited to the clockwise direction which could 
negatively impact formation flight goals.   Also, translational maneuvers in the positive y direction 
would be impaired.  This hazard presents no danger to equipment or testing personnel.
The design of the electrical boards which control the thrusters are not under the control of the 
propulsion subsystem.  However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the 
system.  Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is 
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Tr05 Locked Open Tr05 (TrL1a01)
Pre-mitigation Classification
Hazard Analysis
The Lee Valve designed is a 'fail safe' design in that the valve is designed to close if power is not 
continually supplied to the solenoid.  Therefore, most likely cause of a valve stuck in the open 
position is a defective part.
The consequences of such a failure would be felt immediately upon opening the two isolation 
valves.   The thruster would be activated and a continuous stream of propellant would be released 
from the nozzle; thus causing the satellite to careen out of control.   During testing, this failure 
mode would release propellant into the testing area in amounts possibly greater than expected.
Due to the fail safe nature of the design, it is considered a remote possibility that the isolation valve 
will be stuck in the open position.
All defective valves discovered in the testing process will be replaced.
Thorough testing of all valves will be conducted.  All testing will occur in well ventilated areas (such 
as the fume hood present in the SSE lab) to mitigate the risk of propellant exposure.  Any deviations 
from nominal operation will be recorded and reported to the proper authorities.  All valves failing to 
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Each part will be cleaned with isopropyl alcohol prior to incorporation within the system.  This 
should limit the remaining debris.
Hazard Analysis
The inner mechanisms of the valves as well as the throat of the nozzle are extremely narrow and 
easily clogged with foreign material present within the propellant lines.  (Left over material from the 
construction process such as metallic shavings)
Foreign material lodged within the valve can interfere with the workings of the internal poppet and 
lock the valve in either the open or closed position.  Foreign material lodged within the nozzle 
would prevent propellant flow and end the usefulness of the thruster.
Since all parts of the propulsion system are machined, the possibility of foreign debris lodged within 
the propellant lines can not be discounted.  Without mitigation a clog of the valve and/or nozzle is 
likely to be a frequent occurrence.
Fine mesh filters added before each valve within the system will capture any debris before it can 
interfere with the internal workings of the valve.
Prop-048 4
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Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed 
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly.  Each step 
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician 
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be reported to the 
appropriate authorities.  Additionally, all system testing will be conducted in a well ventilated area 
such as the fume hood in the SSE lab.
Hazard Analysis
For the thruster to burst, it would have to experience a propellant pressure greater than its yield 
pressure.  Additionally, over heating of the valve could cause the outer casing of the valve to 
rupture.
If Thruster Tr05 was to burst, the resulting propellant loss would send the satellite off course and 
trigger a safe mode within the satellite.  Thus, the formation flight portion of the mission would be 
ended prematurely and extended mission operations would be in jeopardy.  Should the burst 
happen during testing, the resulting propellant loss could release unexpected amounts of propellant 
and increase the risk of exposure.  
Valve rupture due to over pressurization is a remote possibility due to the high factors of safety 
associated with the valve.  The valve is rated to 1125 psi; therefore even discounting the presence of 
the pressure regulator, at the 100 psi setting, the FOS is greater than 11.  For the 307 psi setting, the 
FOS is still a respectable 3.66.  Valve rupture due to over heating is also considered a remote 
possibility based upon the expected temperature range for the mission.  The valve is rated to 70 C 
and has been observed during functional testing by MAS to function properly at temperatures 
greater than 100 C.                       
Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the 
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.
Prop-049 3
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The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer 
tightening procedures are followed.  Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a 
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point.  Each step of the 
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance 
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be 
reported to the appropriate authorities.  Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a 
controlled manner to ensure any potential leak is addressed prior to launch.
When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account.  If procedures are not 
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous 
situations can occur.
No physical mitigation is possible for this hazard.




The most likely cause of a noticeable leak stemming from the thruster Tr05 is improper tightening of 
the Swagelok connection.
A leak at this point in the system would not pose a problem until the propulsion system was 
activated and formation flight implemented.  At that point the leak would cause propellant loss 
which would lessen the amount of time available for formation flight.  Additionally, the loss of 
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Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary.  Such testing will begin with 
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and 
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration.  Any deviations from nominal operation will be 
recorded and reported to the proper authorities.  Electrical problems documented in the testing 
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.
The design of the electrical boards which control the isolation valves are not under the control of 
the propulsion subsystem.  However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the 
system.  Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is 
currently rated as probable.
A properly designed electronics board controlling the system could reduce the probability to 
remote.




The voltage step-down is accomplished by the propulsion electronics board.  The most obvious 
cause of the failure of voltage step-down for the isolation valve would be the failure of the 
electronics board either due to component malfunction or improper design.
The Lee valves used for the MR SAT propulsion system rely on a 24 V pulse to open.  The voltage is 
then stepped down to 5 volts to maintain the open state.  If the step-down process does not occur 
within the time specified, the excess voltage could destroy the solenoid and cause the valve to over 
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Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary.  Such testing will begin with 
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and 
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration.  Any deviations from nominal operation will be 
recorded and reported to the proper authorities.  Electrical problems documented in the testing 
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.
The design of the electrical boards which control the thrusters are not under the control of the 
propulsion subsystem.  However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the 
system.  Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is 
currently rated as probable.
Change out non working valves.




The most likely cause for a thruster valve being locked in the closed position is an electrical problem 
preventing the opening of the valve.  This could be the electrical board never sending the 24 volt 
pulse required for opening, or physical damage to the internal solenoid of the valve.
Thruster Tr06 is responsible for providing clockwise rotation around the x axis of the satellite 
(assuming positive x axis runs through panel 4).  With this thruster stuck in the closed position, 
rotation maneuvers around the x axis would be limited to the counterclockwise direction which 
could negatively impact formation flight goals.  Also, translational maneuvers in the positive y 
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Thorough testing of all valves will be conducted.  All testing will occur in well ventilated areas (such 
as the fume hood present in the SSE lab) to mitigate the risk of propellant exposure.  Any deviations 
from nominal operation will be recorded and reported to the proper authorities.  All valves failing to 
achieve nominal operation will be replace.
The consequences of such a failure would be felt immediately upon opening the two isolation 
valves.   The thruster would be activated and a continuous stream of propellant would be released 
from the nozzle; thus causing the satellite to careen out of control.   During testing, this failure 
mode would release propellant into the testing area in amounts possibly greater than expected.
Due to the fail safe nature of the design, it is considered a remote possibility that the isolation valve 
will be stuck in the open position.
All defective valves discovered in the testing process will be replaced.
4




The Lee Valve designed is a 'fail safe' design in that the valve is designed to close if power is not 
continually supplied to the solenoid.  Therefore, most likely cause of a valve stuck in the open 
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Fine mesh filters added before each valve within the system will capture any debris before it can 
interfere with the internal workings of the valve.
Foreign material lodged within the valve can interfere with the workings of the internal poppet and 
lock the valve in either the open or closed position.  Foreign material lodged within the nozzle 
would prevent propellant flow and end the usefulness of the thruster.
Hazard Analysis
Tr06 Clogged Tr06 (TrL1b01)
Prop-054 4
Pre-mitigation Classification
The inner mechanisms of the valves as well as the throat of the nozzle are extremely narrow and 
easily clogged with foreign material present within the propellant lines.  (Left over material from the 
construction process such as metallic shavings)
Since all parts of the propulsion system are machined, the possibility of foreign debris lodged within 
the propellant lines can not be discounted.  Without mitigation a clog of the valve and/or nozzle is 
likely to be a frequent occurrence.
Each part will be cleaned with isopropyl alcohol prior to incorporation within the system.  This 
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Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the 
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.
If Thruster Tr06 was to burst, the resulting propellant loss would send the satellite off course and 
trigger a safe mode within the satellite.  Thus, the formation flight portion of the mission would be 
ended prematurely and extended mission operations would be in jeopardy.  Should the burst 
happen during testing, the resulting propellant loss could release unexpected amounts of propellant 
and increase the risk of exposure.  
Hazard Analysis
Tr06 Burst Tr06 (TrL1b01)
Prop-055 3
Pre-mitigation Classification
For the thruster to burst, it would have to experience a propellant pressure greater than its yield 
pressure.  Additionally, over heating of the valve could cause the outer casing of the valve to 
rupture.
Valve rupture due to over pressurization is a remote possibility due to the high factors of safety 
associated with the valve.  The valve is rated to 1125 psi; therefore even discounting the presence of 
the pressure regulator, at the 100 psi setting, the FOS is greater than 11.  For the 307 psi setting, the 
FOS is still a respectable 3.66.  Valve rupture due to over heating is also considered a remote 
possibility based upon the expected temperature range for the mission.  The valve is rated to 70 C 
and has been observed during functional testing by MAS to function properly at temperatures 
greater than 100 C.                       
Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed 
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly.  Each step 
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician 
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be reported to the 
appropriate authorities.  Additionally, all system testing will be conducted in a well ventilated area 
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No physical mitigation is possible for this hazard.
A leak at this point in the system would not pose a problem until the propulsion system was 
activated and formation flight implemented.  At that point the leak would cause propellant loss 
which would lessen the amount of time available for formation flight.  Additionally, the loss of 
pressure just before the nozzle would reduce the thrust produced by this thruster and thus hinder 
propulsive maneuvers.
Hazard Analysis
Tr06 leak Tr06 (TrL1b01)
4Prop-056
Pre-mitigation Classification
The most likely cause of a noticeable leak stemming from the thruster Tr06 is improper tightening of 
the Swagelok connection.
When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account.  If procedures are not 
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous 
situations can occur.
The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer 
tightening procedures are followed.  Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a 
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point.  Each step of the 
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance 
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be 
reported to the appropriate authorities.  Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a 
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Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary.  Such testing will begin with 
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and 
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration.  Any deviations from nominal operation will be 
recorded and reported to the proper authorities.  Electrical problems documented in the testing 
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.
The design of the electrical boards which control the isolation valves are not under the control of 
the propulsion subsystem.  However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the 
system.  Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is 
currently rated as probable.
Pre-mitigation Classification
A properly designed electronics board controlling the system could reduce the probability to 
remote.
The voltage step-down is accomplished by the propulsion electronics board.  The most obvious 
cause of the failure of voltage step-down for the isolation valve would be the failure of the 
electronics board either due to component malfunction or improper design.
The Lee valves used for the MR SAT propulsion system rely on a 24 V pulse to open.  The voltage is 
then stepped down to 5 volts to maintain the open state.  If the step-down process does not occur 
within the time specified, the excess voltage could destroy the solenoid and cause the valve to over 
heat and possibly rupture.  
Hazard Analysis
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Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary.  Such testing will begin with 
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and 
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration.  Any deviations from nominal operation will be 
recorded and reported to the proper authorities.  Electrical problems documented in the testing 
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.
The design of the electrical boards which control the thrusters are not under the control of the 
propulsion subsystem.  However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the 
system.  Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is 
currently rated as probable.
Pre-mitigation Classification
Change out non working valves.
The most likely cause for a thruster valve being locked in the closed position is an electrical problem 
preventing the opening of the valve.  This could be the electrical board never sending the 24 volt 
pulse required for opening, or physical damage to the internal solenoid of the valve.
Thruster Tr01 is responsible for providing clockwise rotation around the y axis of the satellite 
(assuming positive x axis runs through panel 4).  With this thruster stuck in the closed position, 
rotation maneuvers around the y axis would be limited to the counterclockwise direction which 
could negatively impact formation flight goals.  Also, translational maneuvers in the positive x 
direction would be impaired.  This hazard presents no danger to equipment or testing personnel.
Hazard Analysis






Hazard Number Final RAC



















Thorough testing of all valves will be conducted.  All testing will occur in well ventilated areas (such 
as the fume hood present in the SSE lab) to mitigate the risk of propellant exposure.  Any deviations 
from nominal operation will be recorded and reported to the proper authorities.  All valves failing to 
achieve nominal operation will be replace.
Due to the fail safe nature of the design, it is considered a remote possibility that the isolation valve 
will be stuck in the open position.
Pre-mitigation Classification
4
All defective valves discovered in the testing process will be replaced.
The Lee Valve designed is a 'fail safe' design in that the valve is designed to close if power is not 
continually supplied to the solenoid.  Therefore, most likely cause of a valve stuck in the open 
position is a defective part.
The consequences of such a failure would be felt immediately upon opening the two isolation 
valves.   The thruster would be activated and a continuous stream of propellant would be released 
from the nozzle; thus causing the satellite to careen out of control.   During testing, this failure 
mode would release propellant into the testing area in amounts possibly greater than expected.
Hazard Analysis
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Each part will be cleaned with isopropyl alcohol prior to incorporation within the system.  This 
should limit the remaining debris.
Since all parts of the propulsion system are machined, the possibility of foreign debris lodged within 
the propellant lines can not be discounted.  Without mitigation a clog of the valve and/or nozzle is 
likely to be a frequent occurrence.
Pre-mitigation Classification
Prop-060
Fine mesh filters added before each valve within the system will capture any debris before it can 
interfere with the internal workings of the valve.
The inner mechanisms of the valves as well as the throat of the nozzle are extremely narrow and 
easily clogged with foreign material present within the propellant lines.  (Left over material from the 
construction process such as metallic shavings)
Foreign material lodged within the valve can interfere with the workings of the internal poppet and 
lock the valve in either the open or closed position.  Foreign material lodged within the nozzle 
would prevent propellant flow and end the usefulness of the thruster.
Hazard Analysis
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Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed 
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly.  Each step 
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician 
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be reported to the 
appropriate authorities.  Additionally, all system testing will be conducted in a well ventilated area 
such as the fume hood in the SSE lab.
Valve rupture due to over pressurization is a remote possibility due to the high factors of safety 
associated with the valve.  The valve is rated to 1125 psi; therefore even discounting the presence of 
the pressure regulator, at the 100 psi setting, the FOS is greater than 11.  For the 307 psi setting, the 
FOS is still a respectable 3.66.  Valve rupture due to over heating is also considered a remote 
possibility based upon the expected temperature range for the mission.  The valve is rated to 70 C 
and has been observed during functional testing by MAS to function properly at temperatures 
greater than 100 C.                       
Pre-mitigation Classification
Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the 
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.
For the thruster to burst, it would have to experience a propellant pressure greater than its yield 
pressure.  Additionally, over heating of the valve could cause the outer casing of the valve to 
rupture.
If Thruster Tr01 was to burst, the resulting propellant loss would send the satellite off course and 
trigger a safe mode within the satellite.  Thus, the formation flight portion of the mission would be 
ended prematurely and extended mission operations would be in jeopardy.  Should the burst 
happen during testing, the resulting propellant loss could release unexpected amounts of propellant 
and increase the risk of exposure.  
Hazard Analysis
Prop-061 3
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No physical mitigation is possible for this hazard.
A leak at this point in the system would not pose a problem until the propulsion system was 
activated and formation flight implemented.  At that point the leak would cause propellant loss 
which would lessen the amount of time available for formation flight.  Additionally, the loss of 
pressure just before the nozzle would reduce the thrust produced by this thruster and thus hinder 
propulsive maneuvers.
Hazard Analysis
Tr01 leak Tr01 (TrL2a101)
Prop-062 4
Pre-mitigation Classification
The most likely cause of a noticeable leak stemming from the thruster Tr01 is improper tightening of 
the Swagelok connection.
When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account.  If procedures are not 
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous 
situations can occur.
The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer 
tightening procedures are followed.  Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a 
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point.  Each step of the 
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance 
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be 
reported to the appropriate authorities.  Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a 





Hazard Number Final RAC



















A properly designed electronics board controlling the system could reduce the probability to 
remote.
The Lee valves used for the MR SAT propulsion system rely on a 24 V pulse to open.  The voltage is 
then stepped down to 5 volts to maintain the open state.  If the step-down process does not occur 
within the time specified, the excess voltage could destroy the solenoid and cause the valve to over 
heat and possibly rupture.  
Hazard Analysis
Voltage step-down malfunction Tr01 (TrL2a1-01)
Prop-063 4
Pre-mitigation Classification
The voltage step-down is accomplished by the propulsion electronics board.  The most obvious 
cause of the failure of voltage step-down for the isolation valve would be the failure of the 
electronics board either due to component malfunction or improper design.
The design of the electrical boards which control the isolation valves are not under the control of 
the propulsion subsystem.  However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the 
system.  Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is 
currently rated as probable.
Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary.  Such testing will begin with 
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and 
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration.  Any deviations from nominal operation will be 
recorded and reported to the proper authorities.  Electrical problems documented in the testing 
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Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary.  Such testing will begin with 
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and 
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration.  Any deviations from nominal operation will be 
recorded and reported to the proper authorities.  Electrical problems documented in the testing 
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.
The design of the electrical boards which control the thrusters are not under the control of the 
propulsion subsystem.  However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the 
system.  Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is 
currently rated as probable.
Pre-mitigation Classification
Change out non working valves.
The most likely cause for a thruster valve being locked in the closed position is an electrical problem 
preventing the opening of the valve.  This could be the electrical board never sending the 24 volt 
pulse required for opening, or physical damage to the internal solenoid of the valve.
Thruster Tr02 is responsible for providing counterclockwise rotation around the z axis of the satellite 
(assuming positive x axis runs through panel 4).  With this thruster stuck in the closed position, 
rotation maneuvers around the z axis would be limited to the clockwise direction which could 
negatively impact formation flight goals.  Also, translational maneuvers in the positive x direction 
would be impaired.  This hazard presents no danger to equipment or testing personnel.
Hazard Analysis
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Thorough testing of all valves will be conducted.  All testing will occur in well ventilated areas (such 
as the fume hood present in the SSE lab) to mitigate the risk of propellant exposure.  Any deviations 
from nominal operation will be recorded and reported to the proper authorities.  All valves failing to 
achieve nominal operation will be replace.
Due to the fail safe nature of the design, it is considered a remote possibility that the isolation valve 
will be stuck in the open position.
Pre-mitigation Classification
All defective valves discovered in the testing process will be replaced.
The Lee Valve designed is a 'fail safe' design in that the valve is designed to close if power is not 
continually supplied to the solenoid.  Therefore, most likely cause of a valve stuck in the open 
position is a defective part.
The consequences of such a failure would be felt immediately upon opening the two isolation 
valves.   The thruster would be activated and a continuous stream of propellant would be released 
from the nozzle; thus causing the satellite to careen out of control.   During testing, this failure 
mode would release propellant into the testing area in amounts possibly greater than expected.
Hazard Analysis
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Each part will be cleaned with isopropyl alcohol prior to incorporation within the system.  This 
should limit the remaining debris.
Since all parts of the propulsion system are machined, the possibility of foreign debris lodged within 
the propellant lines can not be discounted.  Without mitigation a clog of the valve and/or nozzle is 
likely to be a frequent occurrence.
Pre-mitigation Classification
4
Fine mesh filters added before each valve within the system will capture any debris before it can 
interfere with the internal workings of the valve.
The inner mechanisms of the valves as well as the throat of the nozzle are extremely narrow and 
easily clogged with foreign material present within the propellant lines.  (Left over material from the 
construction process such as metallic shavings)
Foreign material lodged within the valve can interfere with the workings of the internal poppet and 
lock the valve in either the open or closed position.  Foreign material lodged within the nozzle 
would prevent propellant flow and end the usefulness of the thruster.
Hazard Analysis
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Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed 
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly.  Each step 
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician 
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be reported to the 
appropriate authorities.  Additionally, all system testing will be conducted in a well ventilated area 
such as the fume hood in the SSE lab.
Valve rupture due to over pressurization is a remote possibility due to the high factors of safety 
associated with the valve.  The valve is rated to 1125 psi; therefore even discounting the presence of 
the pressure regulator, at the 100 psi setting, the FOS is greater than 11.  For the 307 psi setting, the 
FOS is still a respectable 3.66.  Valve rupture due to over heating is also considered a remote 
possibility based upon the expected temperature range for the mission.  The valve is rated to 70 C 
and has been observed during functional testing by MAS to function properly at temperatures 
greater than 100 C.                       
Pre-mitigation Classification
Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the 
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.
For the thruster to burst, it would have to experience a propellant pressure greater than its yield 
pressure.  Additionally, over heating of the valve could cause the outer casing of the valve to 
rupture.
If Thruster Tr02 was to burst, the resulting propellant loss would send the satellite off course and 
trigger a safe mode within the satellite.  Thus, the formation flight portion of the mission would be 
ended prematurely and extended mission operations would be in jeopardy.  Should the burst 
happen during testing, the resulting propellant loss could release unexpected amounts of propellant 
and increase the risk of exposure.  
Hazard Analysis
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The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer 
tightening procedures are followed.  Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a 
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point.  Each step of the 
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance 
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be 
reported to the appropriate authorities.  Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a 
controlled manner to ensure any potential leak is addressed prior to launch.
When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account.  If procedures are not 
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous 
situations can occur.
Pre-mitigation Classification
No physical mitigation is possible for this hazard.
The most likely cause of a noticeable leak stemming from the thruster Tr02 is improper tightening of 
the Swagelok connection.
A leak at this point in the system would not pose a problem until the propulsion system was 
activated and formation flight implemented.  At that point the leak would cause propellant loss 
which would lessen the amount of time available for formation flight.  Additionally, the loss of 
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Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary.  Such testing will begin with 
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and 
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration.  Any deviations from nominal operation will be 
recorded and reported to the proper authorities.  Electrical problems documented in the testing 
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.
The design of the electrical boards which control the isolation valves are not under the control of 
the propulsion subsystem.  However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the 
system.  Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is 
currently rated as probable.
Pre-mitigation Classification
A properly designed electronics board controlling the system could reduce the probability to 
remote.
The voltage step-down is accomplished by the propulsion electronics board.  The most obvious 
cause of the failure of voltage step-down for the isolation valve would be the failure of the 
electronics board either due to component malfunction or improper design.
The Lee valves used for the MR SAT propulsion system rely on a 24 V pulse to open.  The voltage is 
then stepped down to 5 volts to maintain the open state.  If the step-down process does not occur 
within the time specified, the excess voltage could destroy the solenoid and cause the valve to over 
heat and possibly rupture.  
Hazard Analysis
Prop-069 4
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Change out non working valves.
Thruster Tr03 is responsible for providing clockwise rotation around the z axis of the satellite 
(assuming positive x axis runs through panel 4).  With this thruster stuck in the closed position, 
rotation maneuvers around the z axis would be limited to the counterclockwise direction which 
could negatively impact formation flight goals.  Also, translational maneuvers in the positive x 
direction would be impaired.  This hazard presents no danger to equipment or testing personnel.
Hazard Analysis
Tr03 stuck closed Tr03 (TrL2b1-01)
Prop-070 4
Pre-mitigation Classification
The most likely cause for a thruster valve being locked in the closed position is an electrical problem 
preventing the opening of the valve.  This could be the electrical board never sending the 24 volt 
pulse required for opening, or physical damage to the internal solenoid of the valve.
The design of the electrical boards which control the thrusters are not under the control of the 
propulsion subsystem.  However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the 
system.  Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is 
currently rated as probable.
Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary.  Such testing will begin with 
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and 
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration.  Any deviations from nominal operation will be 
recorded and reported to the proper authorities.  Electrical problems documented in the testing 
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All defective valves discovered in the testing process will be replaced.
The consequences of such a failure would be felt immediately upon opening the two isolation 
valves.   The thruster would be activated and a continuous stream of propellant would be released 
from the nozzle; thus causing the satellite to careen out of control.   During testing, this failure 
mode would release propellant into the testing area in amounts possibly greater than expected.
Hazard Analysis
Tr03 Locked Open Tr03 (TrL2b1-01)
4Prop-071
Pre-mitigation Classification
The Lee Valve designed is a 'fail safe' design in that the valve is designed to close if power is not 
continually supplied to the solenoid.  Therefore, most likely cause of a valve stuck in the open 
position is a defective part.
Due to the fail safe nature of the design, it is considered a remote possibility that the isolation valve 
will be stuck in the open position.
Thorough testing of all valves will be conducted.  All testing will occur in well ventilated areas (such 
as the fume hood present in the SSE lab) to mitigate the risk of propellant exposure.  Any deviations 
from nominal operation will be recorded and reported to the proper authorities.  All valves failing to 
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Each part will be cleaned with isopropyl alcohol prior to incorporation within the system.  This 
should limit the remaining debris.
Since all parts of the propulsion system are machined, the possibility of foreign debris lodged within 
the propellant lines can not be discounted.  Without mitigation a clog of the valve and/or nozzle is 
likely to be a frequent occurrence.
Pre-mitigation Classification
Fine mesh filters added before each valve within the system will capture any debris before it can 
interfere with the internal workings of the valve.
The inner mechanisms of the valves as well as the throat of the nozzle are extremely narrow and 
easily clogged with foreign material present within the propellant lines.  (Left over material from the 
construction process such as metallic shavings)
Foreign material lodged within the valve can interfere with the workings of the internal poppet and 
lock the valve in either the open or closed position.  Foreign material lodged within the nozzle 
would prevent propellant flow and end the usefulness of the thruster.
Hazard Analysis
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Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed 
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly.  Each step 
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician 
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be reported to the 
appropriate authorities.  Additionally, all system testing will be conducted in a well ventilated area 
such as the fume hood in the SSE lab.
Valve rupture due to over pressurization is a remote possibility due to the high factors of safety 
associated with the valve.  The valve is rated to 1125 psi; therefore even discounting the presence of 
the pressure regulator, at the 100 psi setting, the FOS is greater than 11.  For the 307 psi setting, the 
FOS is still a respectable 3.66.  Valve rupture due to over heating is also considered a remote 
possibility based upon the expected temperature range for the mission.  The valve is rated to 70 C 
and has been observed during functional testing by MAS to function properly at temperatures 
greater than 100 C.                       
Pre-mitigation Classification
3
Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the 
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.
For the thruster to burst, it would have to experience a propellant pressure greater than its yield 
pressure.  Additionally, over heating of the valve could cause the outer casing of the valve to 
rupture.
If Thruster Tr03 was to burst, the resulting propellant loss would send the satellite off course and 
trigger a safe mode within the satellite.  Thus, the formation flight portion of the mission would be 
ended prematurely and extended mission operations would be in jeopardy.  Should the burst 
happen during testing, the resulting propellant loss could release unexpected amounts of propellant 
and increase the risk of exposure.  
Hazard Analysis
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The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer 
tightening procedures are followed.  Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a 
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point.  Each step of the 
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance 
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be 
reported to the appropriate authorities.  Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a 
controlled manner to ensure any potential leak is addressed prior to launch.
When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account.  If procedures are not 




No physical mitigation is possible for this hazard.
The most likely cause of a noticeable leak stemming from the thruster Tr03 is improper tightening of 
the Swagelok connection.
A leak at this point in the system would not pose a problem until the propulsion system was 
activated and formation flight implemented.  At that point the leak would cause propellant loss 
which would lessen the amount of time available for formation flight.  Additionally, the loss of 
pressure just before the nozzle would reduce the thrust produced by this thruster and thus hinder 
propulsive maneuvers.
Hazard Analysis
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Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary.  Such testing will begin with 
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and 
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration.  Any deviations from nominal operation will be 
recorded and reported to the proper authorities.  Electrical problems documented in the testing 
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.
The design of the electrical boards which control the isolation valves are not under the control of 
the propulsion subsystem.  However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the 
system.  Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is 
currently rated as probable.
Pre-mitigation Classification
A properly designed electronics board controlling the system could reduce the probability to 
remote.
The voltage step-down is accomplished by the propulsion electronics board.  The most obvious 
cause of the failure of voltage step-down for the isolation valve would be the failure of the 
electronics board either due to component malfunction or improper design.
The Lee valves used for the MR SAT propulsion system rely on a 24 V pulse to open.  The voltage is 
then stepped down to 5 volts to maintain the open state.  If the step-down process does not occur 
within the time specified, the excess voltage could destroy the solenoid and cause the valve to over 
heat and possibly rupture.  
Hazard Analysis
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Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary.  Such testing will begin with 
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and 
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration.  Any deviations from nominal operation will be 
recorded and reported to the proper authorities.  Electrical problems documented in the testing 
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.
The design of the electrical boards which control the thrusters are not under the control of the 
propulsion subsystem.  However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the 
system.  Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is 
currently rated as probable.
Pre-mitigation Classification
Change out non working valves.
The most likely cause for a thruster valve being locked in the closed position is an electrical problem 
preventing the opening of the valve.  This could be the electrical board never sending the 24 volt 
pulse required for opening, or physical damage to the internal solenoid of the valve.
Thruster Tr04 is responsible for providing counterclockwise rotation around the y axis of the satellite 
(assuming positive x axis runs through panel 4).  With this thruster stuck in the closed position, 
rotation maneuvers around the y axis would be limited to the clockwise direction which could 
negatively impact formation flight goals.  Also, translational maneuvers in the positive x direction 
would be impaired.  This hazard presents no danger to equipment or testing personnel.
Hazard Analysis
Prop-076 4





Hazard Number Final RAC



















Thorough testing of all valves will be conducted.  All testing will occur in well ventilated areas (such 
as the fume hood present in the SSE lab) to mitigate the risk of propellant exposure.  Any deviations 
from nominal operation will be recorded and reported to the proper authorities.  All valves failing to 
achieve nominal operation will be replace.
Due to the fail safe nature of the design, it is considered a remote possibility that the isolation valve 
will be stuck in the open position.
Pre-mitigation Classification
All defective valves discovered in the testing process will be replaced.
The Lee Valve designed is a 'fail safe' design in that the valve is designed to close if power is not 
continually supplied to the solenoid.  Therefore, most likely cause of a valve stuck in the open 
position is a defective part.
The consequences of such a failure would be felt immediately upon opening the two isolation 
valves.   The thruster would be activated and a continuous stream of propellant would be released 
from the nozzle; thus causing the satellite to careen out of control.   During testing, this failure 
mode would release propellant into the testing area in amounts possibly greater than expected.
Hazard Analysis
Prop-077 4
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Fine mesh filters added before each valve within the system will capture any debris before it can 
interfere with the internal workings of the valve.
Foreign material lodged within the valve can interfere with the workings of the internal poppet and 
lock the valve in either the open or closed position.  Foreign material lodged within the nozzle 
would prevent propellant flow and end the usefulness of the thruster.
Hazard Analysis
Tr04 Clogged Tr04 (TrL2b2-01)
Prop-078 4
Pre-mitigation Classification
The inner mechanisms of the valves as well as the throat of the nozzle are extremely narrow and 
easily clogged with foreign material present within the propellant lines.  (Left over material from the 
construction process such as metallic shavings)
Since all parts of the propulsion system are machined, the possibility of foreign debris lodged within 
the propellant lines can not be discounted.  Without mitigation a clog of the valve and/or nozzle is 
likely to be a frequent occurrence.
Each part will be cleaned with isopropyl alcohol prior to incorporation within the system.  This 
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Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the 
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.
If Thruster Tr04 was to burst, the resulting propellant loss would send the satellite off course and 
trigger a safe mode within the satellite.  Thus, the formation flight portion of the mission would be 
ended prematurely and extended mission operations would be in jeopardy.  Should the burst 
happen during testing, the resulting propellant loss could release unexpected amounts of propellant 
and increase the risk of exposure.  
Hazard Analysis
Tr04 Burst Tr04 (TrL2b2-01)
3Prop-079
Pre-mitigation Classification
For the thruster to burst, it would have to experience a propellant pressure greater than its yield 
pressure.  Additionally, over heating of the valve could cause the outer casing of the valve to 
rupture.
Valve rupture due to over pressurization is a remote possibility due to the high factors of safety 
associated with the valve.  The valve is rated to 1125 psi; therefore even discounting the presence of 
the pressure regulator, at the 100 psi setting, the FOS is greater than 11.  For the 307 psi setting, the 
FOS is still a respectable 3.66.  Valve rupture due to over heating is also considered a remote 
possibility based upon the expected temperature range for the mission.  The valve is rated to 70 C 
and has been observed during functional testing by MAS to function properly at temperatures 
greater than 100 C.                       
Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed 
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly.  Each step 
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician 
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be reported to the 
appropriate authorities.  Additionally, all system testing will be conducted in a well ventilated area 
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The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer 
tightening procedures are followed.  Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a 
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point.  Each step of the 
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance 
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be 
reported to the appropriate authorities.  Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a 
controlled manner to ensure any potential leak is addressed prior to launch.
When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account.  If procedures are not 
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous 
situations can occur.
Pre-mitigation Classification
No physical mitigation is possible for this hazard.
The most likely cause of a noticeable leak stemming from the thruster Tr04 is improper tightening of 
the Swagelok connection.
A leak at this point in the system would not pose a problem until the propulsion system was 
activated and formation flight implemented.  At that point the leak would cause propellant loss 
which would lessen the amount of time available for formation flight.  Additionally, the loss of 
pressure just before the nozzle would reduce the thrust produced by this thruster and thus hinder 
propulsive maneuvers.
Hazard Analysis
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Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary.  Such testing will begin with 
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and 
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration.  Any deviations from nominal operation will be 
recorded and reported to the proper authorities.  Electrical problems documented in the testing 
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.
The design of the electrical boards which control the isolation valves are not under the control of 
the propulsion subsystem.  However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the 
system.  Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is 
currently rated as probable.
Pre-mitigation Classification
4
A properly designed electronics board controlling the system could reduce the probability to 
remote.
The voltage step-down is accomplished by the propulsion electronics board.  The most obvious 
cause of the failure of voltage step-down for the isolation valve would be the failure of the 
electronics board either due to component malfunction or improper design.
The Lee valves used for the MR SAT propulsion system rely on a 24 V pulse to open.  The voltage is 
then stepped down to 5 volts to maintain the open state.  If the step-down process does not occur 
within the time specified, the excess voltage could destroy the solenoid and cause the valve to over 
heat and possibly rupture.  
Hazard Analysis
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Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary.  Such testing will begin with 
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and 
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration.  Any deviations from nominal operation will be 
recorded and reported to the proper authorities.  Electrical problems documented in the testing 
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.
The design of the electrical boards which control the thrusters are not under the control of the 
propulsion subsystem.  However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the 
system.  Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is 
currently rated as probable.
Pre-mitigation Classification
Prop-082 4
Change out non working valves.
The most likely cause for a thruster valve being locked in the closed position is an electrical problem 
preventing the opening of the valve.  This could be the electrical board never sending the 24 volt 
pulse required for opening, or physical damage to the internal solenoid of the valve.
Thruster Tr07 is responsible for providing the counter force necessary to prevent translational motion during 
rotation maneuvers around the x axis (positive x axis directed through panel 4) and translational 
maneuverability in the negative y direction.  With Tr07 stuck closed, the translational force would not be able 
to be canceled out and the satellite would deviate from the formation.  Additionally, translational maneuvers 
in the negative y direction would be impaired.  This hazard presents no danger to equipment or testing 
personnel.
Hazard Analysis
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Thorough testing of all valves will be conducted.  All testing will occur in well ventilated areas (such 
as the fume hood present in the SSE lab) to mitigate the risk of propellant exposure.  Any deviations 
from nominal operation will be recorded and reported to the proper authorities.  All valves failing to 
achieve nominal operation will be replace.
Due to the fail safe nature of the design, it is considered a remote possibility that the isolation valve 
will be stuck in the open position.
Pre-mitigation Classification
Prop-083 4
All defective valves discovered in the testing process will be replaced.
The Lee Valve designed is a 'fail safe' design in that the valve is designed to close if power is not 
continually supplied to the solenoid.  Therefore, most likely cause of a valve stuck in the open 
position is a defective part.
The consequences of such a failure would be felt immediately upon opening the two isolation 
valves.   The thruster would be activated and a continuous stream of propellant would be released 
from the nozzle; thus causing the satellite to translate unexpectedly along the negative y axis.   
During testing, this failure mode would release propellant into the testing area in amounts possibly 
greater than expected.
Hazard Analysis
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Each part will be cleaned with isopropyl alcohol prior to incorporation within the system.  This 
should limit the remaining debris.
Since all parts of the propulsion system are machined, the possibility of foreign debris lodged within 
the propellant lines can not be discounted.  Without mitigation a clog of the valve and/or nozzle is 
likely to be a frequent occurrence.
Pre-mitigation Classification
Fine mesh filters added before each valve within the system will capture any debris before it can 
interfere with the internal workings of the valve.
The inner mechanisms of the valves as well as the throat of the nozzle are extremely narrow and 
easily clogged with foreign material present within the propellant lines.  (Left over material from the 
construction process such as metallic shavings)
Foreign material lodged within the valve can interfere with the workings of the internal poppet and 
lock the valve in either the open or closed position.  Foreign material lodged within the nozzle 
would prevent propellant flow and end the usefulness of the thruster.
Hazard Analysis
Prop-084 4
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Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed 
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly.  Each step 
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician 
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be reported to the 
appropriate authorities.  Additionally, all system testing will be conducted in a well ventilated area 
such as the fume hood in the SSE lab.
Valve rupture due to over pressurization is a remote possibility due to the high factors of safety 
associated with the valve.  The valve is rated to 1125 psi; therefore even discounting the presence of 
the pressure regulator, at the 100 psi setting, the FOS is greater than 11.  For the 307 psi setting, the 
FOS is still a respectable 3.66.  Valve rupture due to over heating is also considered a remote 
possibility based upon the expected temperature range for the mission.  The valve is rated to 70 C 
and has been observed during functional testing by MAS to function properly at temperatures 
greater than 100 C.                       
Pre-mitigation Classification
Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the 
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.
For the thruster to burst, it would have to experience a propellant pressure greater than its yield 
pressure.  Additionally, over heating of the valve could cause the outer casing of the valve to 
rupture.
If Thruster Tr07 was to burst, the resulting propellant loss would send the satellite off course and 
trigger a safe mode within the satellite.  Thus, the formation flight portion of the mission would be 
ended prematurely and extended mission operations would be in jeopardy.  Should the burst 
happen during testing, the resulting propellant loss could release unexpected amounts of propellant 
and increase the risk of exposure.  
Hazard Analysis
Prop-085 3
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When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account.  If procedures are not 
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous 
situations can occur.
No physical mitigation is possible for this hazard.
Hazard Analysis
The most likely cause of a noticeable leak stemming from the thruster Tr07 is improper tightening of 
the Swagelok connection.
Tr07 leak Tr07 (TrL3a-01)
Prop-086 4
Pre-mitigation Classification
A leak at this point in the system would not pose a problem until the propulsion system was 
activated and formation flight implemented.  At that point the leak would cause propellant loss 
which would lessen the amount of time available for formation flight.  Additionally, the loss of 
pressure just before the nozzle would reduce the thrust produced by this thruster and thus hinder 
propulsive maneuvers.
The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer 
tightening procedures are followed.  Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a 
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point.  Each step of the 
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance 
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be 
reported to the appropriate authorities.  Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a 
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The design of the electrical boards which control the isolation valves are not under the control of 
the propulsion subsystem.  However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the 
system.  Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is 
currently rated as probable.
A properly designed electronics board controlling the system could reduce the probability to 
remote.
Hazard Analysis
The voltage step-down is accomplished by the propulsion electronics board.  The most obvious 
cause of the failure of voltage step-down for the isolation valve would be the failure of the 
electronics board either due to component malfunction or improper design.
4
Voltage step-down malfunction Tr07 (TrL3a-01)
Prop-087
Pre-mitigation Classification
The Lee valves used for the MR SAT propulsion system rely on a 24 V pulse to open.  The voltage is 
then stepped down to 5 volts to maintain the open state.  If the step-down process does not occur 
within the time specified, the excess voltage could destroy the solenoid and cause the valve to over 
heat and possibly rupture.  
Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary.  Such testing will begin with 
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and 
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration.  Any deviations from nominal operation will be 
recorded and reported to the proper authorities.  Electrical problems documented in the testing 
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Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary.  Such testing will begin with 
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and 
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration.  Any deviations from nominal operation will be 
recorded and reported to the proper authorities.  Electrical problems documented in the testing 
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.
Thruster Tr08 is responsible for providing the counter force necessary to prevent translational motion during 
rotation maneuvers around the y and z axes (positive x axis directed through panel 4) and translational 
maneuverability in the negative x direction.  With Tr08 stuck closed, the translational force would not be able 
to be canceled out and the satellite would deviate from the formation.  Additionally, translational maneuvers 
in the negative x direction would be impaired.  This hazard presents no danger to equipment or testing 
personnel.
The design of the electrical boards which control the thrusters are not under the control of the 
propulsion subsystem.  However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the 
system.  Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is 
currently rated as probable.
Change out non working valves.
Pre-mitigation Classification
Hazard Analysis
The most likely cause for a thruster valve being locked in the closed position is an electrical problem 
preventing the opening of the valve.  This could be the electrical board never sending the 24 volt 
pulse required for opening, or physical damage to the internal solenoid of the valve.
Prop-088 4
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Thorough testing of all valves will be conducted.  All testing will occur in well ventilated areas (such 
as the fume hood present in the SSE lab) to mitigate the risk of propellant exposure.  Any deviations 
from nominal operation will be recorded and reported to the proper authorities.  All valves failing to 
achieve nominal operation will be replace.
The consequences of such a failure would be felt immediately upon opening the two isolation 
valves.   The thruster would be activated and a continuous stream of propellant would be released 
from the nozzle; thus causing the satellite to translate unexpectedly along the negative x axis.   
During testing, this failure mode would release propellant into the testing area in amounts possibly 
greater than expected.
Due to the fail safe nature of the design, it is considered a remote possibility that the isolation valve 
will be stuck in the open position.
All defective valves discovered in the testing process will be replaced.
Pre-mitigation Classification
Hazard Analysis
The Lee Valve designed is a 'fail safe' design in that the valve is designed to close if power is not 
continually supplied to the solenoid.  Therefore, most likely cause of a valve stuck in the open 
position is a defective part.
Prop-089 4
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Each part will be cleaned with isopropyl alcohol prior to incorporation within the system.  This 
should limit the remaining debris.
Since all parts of the propulsion system are machined, the possibility of foreign debris lodged within 
the propellant lines can not be discounted.  Without mitigation a clog of the valve and/or nozzle is 
likely to be a frequent occurrence.




The inner mechanisms of the valves as well as the throat of the nozzle are extremely narrow and 
easily clogged with foreign material present within the propellant lines.  (Left over material from the 
construction process such as metallic shavings)
Foreign material lodged within the valve can interfere with the workings of the internal poppet and 
lock the valve in either the open or closed position.  Foreign material lodged within the nozzle 
would prevent propellant flow and end the usefulness of the thruster.
Fine mesh filters added before each valve within the system will capture any debris before it can 
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Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed 
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly.  Each step 
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician 
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be reported to the 
appropriate authorities.  Additionally, all system testing will be conducted in a well ventilated area 
such as the fume hood in the SSE lab.
Valve rupture due to over pressurization is a remote possibility due to the high factors of safety 
associated with the valve.  The valve is rated to 1125 psi; therefore even discounting the presence of 
the pressure regulator, at the 100 psi setting, the FOS is greater than 11.  For the 307 psi setting, the 
FOS is still a respectable 3.66.  Valve rupture due to over heating is also considered a remote 
possibility based upon the expected temperature range for the mission.  The valve is rated to 70 C 
and has been observed during functional testing by MAS to function properly at temperatures 
greater than 100 C.                       




For the thruster to burst, it would have to experience a propellant pressure greater than its yield 
pressure.  Additionally, over heating of the valve could cause the outer casing of the valve to 
rupture.
If Thruster Tr08 was to burst, the resulting propellant loss would send the satellite off course and 
trigger a safe mode within the satellite.  Thus, the formation flight portion of the mission would be 
ended prematurely and extended mission operations would be in jeopardy.  Should the burst 
happen during testing, the resulting propellant loss could release unexpected amounts of propellant 
and increase the risk of exposure.  
Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the 
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The prevention of leaks stemming from improper connections requires that the manufacturer 
tightening procedures are followed.  Assembly procedures have been developed which describe in a 
step by step manner the proper method of tightening each connection point.  Each step of the 
assembly procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance 
technician to ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be 
reported to the appropriate authorities.  Additionally, the final assembly will be pressure tested in a 
controlled manner to ensure any potential leak is addressed prior to launch.




The most likely cause of a noticeable leak stemming from the thruster Tr07 is improper tightening of 
the Swagelok connection.
A leak at this point in the system would not pose a problem until the propulsion system was 
activated and formation flight implemented.  At that point the leak would cause propellant loss 
which would lessen the amount of time available for formation flight.  Additionally, the loss of 
pressure just before the nozzle would reduce the thrust produced by this thruster and thus hinder 
propulsive maneuvers.
When assembling a system, human error has to be taken into account.  If procedures are not 
followed exactly and steps are not taken to ensure their correct implementation, hazardous 
situations can occur.
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Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary.  Such testing will begin with 
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and 
valves integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration.  Any deviations from nominal operation will be 
recorded and reported to the proper authorities.  Electrical problems documented in the testing 
process will be addressed and then retested until nominal operation is achieved.
The Lee valves used for the MR SAT propulsion system rely on a 24 V pulse to open.  The voltage is 
then stepped down to 5 volts to maintain the open state.  If the step-down process does not occur 
within the time specified, the excess voltage could destroy the solenoid and cause the valve to over 
heat and possibly rupture.  
4




The voltage step-down is accomplished by the propulsion electronics board.  The most obvious 
cause of the failure of voltage step-down for the isolation valve would be the failure of the 
electronics board either due to component malfunction or improper design.
The design of the electrical boards which control the isolation valves are not under the control of 
the propulsion subsystem.  However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the 
system.  Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is 
currently rated as probable.
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Propellant line rupture due to over pressurization is a remote possibility due to the high factors of 
safety associated with the valve.  The stainless steel lines are rated to 10000 psi; therefore at the 
100 psi setting, the FOS is greater than 100.  For the 307 psi setting, the FOS is still a respectable 
32.57.  
Physical mitigation is not necessary in this case as the factors of safety are sufficient to reduce the 
risk down to acceptable levels for flight.
Hazard Analysis
For the MR SAT propellant lines to burst, the stainless steal material would have to be stressed past 
its yield point by the pressure within the lines.
SS Tubing Burst Variable Prop Lines
Prop-094 3
Pre-mitigation Classification
A rupture of the propellant lines would cause the release of propellant in an undirected manner.  As 
a consequence, the satellite mission likely would end in failure.  During testing, rupture could lead 
to flying debris and possible injury to testing personnel or harm to surrounding equipment.  
Procedural mitigation comes in the form of ensuring that the correct propellant mass is placed 
within the system and that all procedures (assembly, filling, etc.) are performed correctly.  Each step 
of the procedure will be signed off by the performing technician and a quality assurance technician 
to ensure the procedure is followed correctly.  All deviations and problems will be reported to the 
appropriate authorities.  Additionally, all system testing will be conducted in a well ventilated area 
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The design of the electrical boards which control the heaters are not under the control of the 
propulsion subsystem.  However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the 
system.  Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is 
currently rated as probable.
A properly designed electronics board controlling the system could reduce the probability to 
remote.
Hazard Analysis
The tank heater stuck in the on position could be caused by either an electrical malfunction or an 
error within the control code.  
Tank Heater (HTk01) Stuck On HTk01
Prop-095 3
Pre-mitigation Classification
The tank heater stuck in the on position could have several possible consequences.  The first is the 
over heating of the propellant which could lead to  over pressurization of the tank.  Second, the 
heater itself could be damaged, limiting the systems response to temperature loss and inhibiting the 
phase change of the propellant.  
Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary.  Such testing will begin with 
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and 
heaters integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration.  Any deviations from nominal operation will be 
recorded and reported to the proper authorities.  Electrical problems documented in the testing 
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The design of the electrical boards which control the heaters are not under the control of the 
propulsion subsystem.  However, a working design is necessary for the proper functioning of the 
system.  Due to the dependence on as yet untested electronics the probability of problems is 
currently rated as probable.
A properly designed electronics board controlling the system could reduce the probability to 
remote.
Hazard Analysis
The tank heater failing to turn on could be caused by either an electrical malfunction or an error 
within the control code.  
4
Tank Heater (HTk01) Non-Functioning HTk01
Prop-096
Pre-mitigation Classification
While propellant freezing is not a major concern given the temperature range expected for the 
mission, low propellant temperature within the storage tank would prevent the necessary phase 
change from occurring and thus severely limit system performance.  
Thorough testing of all electronics for proper operation is necessary.  Such testing will begin with 
functional testing of the board electronics and end with system level testing of the electronics and 
heaters integrated into a 'flat sat' configuration.  Any deviations from nominal operation will be 
recorded and reported to the proper authorities.  Electrical problems documented in the testing 
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